Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-115
Wednesday
15 June 1994

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FBIS-EEU-94-115 *15 June 1994*

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Zhelev Assesses Benefits of 'Partnership'

AU1406174694 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 9 Jun 94 pp 1,3

[Report by Georgi Kardanov: "Security by All for All"]

[Text] Joining the European and Euro-Atlantic economic structures and security systems, which represents part of our foreign policy strategy, offers us the best opportunity to give scope to Bulgarian national interests—Bulgarian President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev made this statement at the Central Military Club in Sofia yesterday in a speech he made to the Atlantic Club.

After our association with the European Union [EU], our membership of the Council of Europe, and our "enhanced" status in the Western European Union [WEU], Bulgaria's relations with NATO within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Initiative acquires particular importance, Dr. Zhelev said. Bulgaria has already signed the outline agreement and has committed itself to the process of seeking a higher degree of security, called security by all for all. Dr. Zhelev outlined the most important features of the initiative: The equality of the parties in their initial positions does not exclude, but presupposes a differentiation, close in time, between the Eastern European states according to their abilities to share responsibilities and fit into the NATO structures and mechanisms; the North Atlantic Alliance aims to internally reorganize and adapt itself to become a common system of security; within this system, the United States retains its participation in building European security, and the role of the WEU will be enhanced; and, lastly, the Partnership initiative in no way aims to isolate Russia, nor does it intend to favor Russia.

Dr. Zhelev noted that for a number of years Bulgaria has been making immense efforts to change the nature of interstate relations in our region, directing them into a new channel; toward good-neighborliness, cooperation, stable development, the opening of borders, and real integration into the rest of Europe, due to which the ideas of the Partnership for Peace are in harmony with our own national interests. The president sees grounds for this in the following factors. First, now the Balkans are no longer split into blocs or divided along ideological lines; quite the reverse, the Balkan countries, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] included, accept the initiative. In this way we can avert the greatest danger for the region, namely the appearance of alliances—"Orthodox or Pan-Slavic axes," an "Islamic crescent," and other configurations—that in past history were the precursors of Balkan wars and disasters.

Second, Bulgaria is surrounded by neighbors that are militarily superior to it in both absolute and relative terms, producing a tendency for the imbalance to become greater. It is precisely the PFP Initiative that will help to fill the "vacuum" in the sphere of regional balances. Bulgaria is also interested in mutually acceptable levels of the individual components of the military balance, in transparency, and in the application of the Treaty on Limiting Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, but measures in relation to the Balkans cannot be delayed; action is needed now, before it is too late!

After speaking about the possibilities offered by the initiative to the Eastern European countries regarding access to Western markets, Dr. Zhelev urged Bulgarian companies, banks, and institutions to utilize these opportunities in the most rational manner, including in the struggle of the police and the investigation organs against organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and smuggling, by relying on partnership and professional cooperation within the framework of NATO.

The president devoted special attention to the effect that the Partnership initiative will have on the reform of the Bulgarian Army, military science, and the country's defense potential. First, the Defense Ministry and the army command would gain indisputable benefit from the relevant NATO documentation—in juridical matters, standardization, material and equipment supplies, communications, and management coordination. In the future, this cooperation may also extend to the fields of military production and the control of and trade in special products. Bulgaria sees possibilities for cooperating with NATO in training specialized units for missions under the aegis of the United Nations and the CSCE. The training of the officer corps also offers broad scope for cooperation, such as in special training courses at NATO centers and military schools, cooperation in training exercises, command staff exercises, and many national field and naval maneuvers. It is no accident that the plan of the Defense Ministry includes the "Breeze '94" naval exercise, with the participation of naval units from the U.S. 6th Fleet, Russia, Greece, Turkey, Ukraine, and Romania, and with observers also invited from Georgia.

Bulgaria's armed forces are going through a difficult and demanding stage of profound reform, in both essence and scope, the aim of which is to maintain in peacetime a small, but high-quality army. Close cooperation with NATO is a precondition for reform to succeed and for the Bulgarian officers corps and all the military to make a worthy contribution to the democratic civic society.

The president's speech was listened to with great interest by the capacity audience, which included representatives of parliament and the government and state institutions; ambassadors and military attaches; Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff; representatives of the Defense Ministry and senior officers of the armed forces; eminent Bulgarian intellectuals; and members of the Atlantic Club.

Deputy Alleges 'Ethnic Purge' in Kurdzhali

AU1306201594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1900 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] An ethnic purge is fully under way in the cultural and economic fields and in the executive power in the Kurdzhali region; this is a deliberate line being followed by the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS]. Stefan Stefanov, National Assembly deputy for the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], made this statement this evening at a news conference in Kurdzhali. He cited dozens of examples of leading Bulgarian officials being replaced by DPS activists lacking the necessary professional qualities. According to the BTA report, Stefan Stefanov tomorrow will brief the BSP parliamentary group on the activities of the DPS in the region and will demand a meeting with Interior Minister Viktor Mikhaylov.

Democratic Justice Leader Discusses Elections

AU1306185294 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 10 Jun 94 p 4

[Interview with Nedim Gendzhev, leader of the Democratic Party of Justice, by Nataliya Vuchkova; place and date not given]

[Text] [Vuchkova] Dr. Gendzhev, is the Democratic Party of Justice ready with its program and, if elections are held, among which parties will it seek a coalition partner?

[Gendzhev] Our party will have a leftist orientation. We can work in coalition with both the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union and the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], despite the fact that some people will not like this. The party's program is social democratic in nature and close to the BSP program. The Union of Democratic Forces, which claims to be a democratic party, has nothing to show the people apart from a pronounced primeval anticommunism. However, this will not help us emerge from the economic crisis, which can only be achieved by national consensus reached by making compromises.

If anyone analyzes the activities of the Bulgarian Parliament during the last two years, he will reach the conclusion that Bulgaria has no Bulgarians who think about their state, only anticommunists and sodomists.

[Vuchkova] Dr. Gendzhev, do you think your party will capture votes from the electorates of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] and Mehmed Hodja's party?

[Gendzhev] We address ourselves to all people, regardless of their party affiliations or official position. We want to develop an economic program for the regions that are in the most wretched situation. The present government is a DPS one, but not one that represents the DPS electorate; it is a government of Ahmed Dogan, Osman Oktay, Yunal Lyutfi, Kadir Kadir, and a handful of others. More than a half of the electors who voted for the DPS at the last elections will now cast their votes for the coalition that we will form. However, one thing is clear—namely that from now on we will not enter any coalition with the DPS or Mehmed Hodja.

[Vuchkova] How will you react to possible accusations that you formed a party on an ethnic basis?

[Gendzhev] One should not make such speculations if a Turk or Muslim stands at the head of a party. I believe that, in this case, one cannot say that our party is religiously or ethnically based.

[Vuchkova] Would you like to comment on the recent practice of identifying religious with ethnic features.

[Gendzhev] One cannot identify the Muslim religion with Turkish nationality. Armenians, Bulgarians, Turks, and Romanies may all be Muslims. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who was both a Frenchman and a Muslim, did not identify himself as a Turk, did he? It must be made clear that Islam is a world religion, not a Turkish one.

A degree of Turkification may indeed be taking place in certain regions, but the more attention you draw to a problem, the more it comes to the forefront of public attention. When they made the Muslims change their names and closed the mosques, did this turn them into Bulgarians?

Second Reactor at Kozloduy Plant Restarted

AU1506101994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 15 Jun 94

[Text] The 440-megawatt second reactor at the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant was restarted and connected to the country's grid. It is expected that by the end of the day it will be functioning at 50 percent of its capacity. The reactor was switched off for three months, during which time it was repaired and refueled. Three additional reactors are functioning at a total capacity of 1,400 megawatt. The plant's fourth and fifth reactors are being repaired.

Klaus Interviewed on Policies, Death Penalty

AU1406144794 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 10 Jun 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Eva Martinkova; place and date not given: "I Am Worried about Parkinson's Sprouts of Bureaucracy"]

[Text] [Martinkova] The fact that the government has been in power for half of its term raises the question whether you have the feeling that certain points in the government policy statement, adopted precisely two years ago, remain to be fulfilled.

[Klaus] I really do not have that feeling. The government policy statement is a document created by 19 government members—some of whom did not know each other before—in the span of several hours. In the span of four years of the existence of this government, a number of ideas are being finalized, completed, pushed from the left to the right, up and down. On one hand, I take the document seriously, but on the other, I do not believe that each of its conjunctions or prepositions has a constant weight. It is possible to say in this global evaluation that the government program is being fulfilled.

[Martinkova] The proposal of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] Executive Council regarding districts as the fundamental pillars of self-administration has surprised not only the coalition partners, but also many ODS representatives. What made the Executive Council present a proposal about which they could anticipate that it would run up against such resistance?

[Klaus] First, I would like to say that this is not a new opinion. We voted on the proposal in the Executive Council six months ago and it won slightly less than 50 percent of supporters at that time. Now it has acquired a substantial support of three-quarters of the Executive Council's members.

The ODS is a party that constantly bases its policy on the citizen. It fears all institutions that are established over the citizen, be it on small or large territory. That is why we try to minimize such institutions. If there is something we are unable to do at present, then it is to suppress completely all Parkinson's sprouts of bureaucracy that are running wild in our country. That is one of the things that I am tremendously worried about.

We are building on the fact that the citizen is the basic and absolute value. All the institutions over him are derived from the citizen, and must be established according to their purpose, efficiency, and also according to whether people want them or not. In that sense, it seems to us that the minimal intervention in the existing regional arrangement would be to utilize the districts that have existed for 35 years and have, due to that fact, certain authenticity, no matter how much people disliked them when they were established in 1960. Adding an elected component to the district bodies could be the least painful and most inexpensive way in the process of forming the regions. That is simply it.

[Martinkova] Serious considerations have appeared recently as to whether the death penalty should be reinstated. Did you give it a thought?

[Klaus] I personally do not believe it is necessary. Being a politician, however, it is my task to think about matters that I have no desire to ponder. I try to react sensitively to public opinion. I have noticed in that respect a noticeable shift in public opinion. I am a bit surprised by it; nevertheless, I respect it. In the first post-November years, the standard humanitarian reaction to the death penalty question was the answer that the death penalty was an extreme solution, which man should not adopt. People pointed to errors and mistakes, etc. That opinion met with unequivocal response and applause in the first post-November years. I have noticed that it has changed over the past six months. My unchanging arguments do not have unequivocal support any longer. There are an increasing number of voices in favor of the death penalty. I pay great attention to the situation, but it is the only reaction to this problem I can describe at the moment.

Klaus Comments on Fund Chief's Departure

LD1406194794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1615 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Regular Tuesday interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondent David Stahlavsky on 14 June; place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Stahlavsky] Mr. Prime Minister, in our regular interviews it has always been me who asked the questions. It occurred to me that we could perhaps make an exception today so that you yourself could pick an event or topic of the past days that you would like to talk about.

[Klaus] You have taken me by surprise. I am really not prepared for this. I think that the topic that somewhat stirred up public opinion as well as the political sphere was, of course, the recalling of Tomas Jezek as the head of the National Property Fund [NPF] and the appointment of the new candidate to that post. [passage omitted]

It seems to me that it is a serious matter. As far as I can see I think the way it was done did not satisfy many—the public in particular. I think that this is a pity. Most of all, it would be a pity to send out to the world any confusing signals which, in my opinion, are not appropriate.

[Stahlavsky] Mr. Prime Minister, in connection with Tomas Jezek's departure from the NPF, Jaroslav Ortman, a representative of the left bloc, said that this is the beginning of a search for the one who is guilty of errors made during privatization.

[Klaus] No, that is certainly not the case. I believe that with Ortman it is a case of wishful thinking. It really is

not the case. The problem is on one side a standard problem, that is a political struggle of one against another. [passage omitted]

[Stahlavsky] [passage omitted] What is your opinion on the strengthening of presidential office powers?

[Klaus] None of us has discussed the strengthening or non- strengthening of the presidential office. Similarly, none of us has dealt with eliminating the Senate from the Constitution. We are permanently being attributed ideas like that and I repeat that we are not dealing with such issues. [passage omitted]

Minister Outlines Arms Procurement 'Philosophy'

AU1406202494 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 13 Jun 94 p 1

[Interview with Defense Minister Antonin Baudys by Miloslav Frydl; place and date not given: "Money Is the Determining Factor in the Modernization of the Czech Army"]

[Text] No decision has been made yet on whether the Army of the Czech Republic will be reequipped with the multipurpose Lada weapons system, Defense Minister Antonin Baudys told CESKY DENIK in an interview. According to his words, Czech firms should be given preference in equipping the Army with modern types of weapons. "In modernizing and reequipping the Army, we are guided by the following basic philosophy: The final supplier will be a Czech company. Only those components will be imported that cannot be manufactured here or for which no one in our country holds a production license. We will have all modernization projects ready by the end of June. The problem lies in disposable resources, that is, in how much money we are going to get from the government and parliament. Money is the absolutely determining factor in modernization. We focus on Czech suppliers, which means that finances invested in the modernization of the army could yield a multiple return because they mean jobs for hundreds of thousands of people. As regards foreign firms that will be interested in cooperating with us by means of joint ventures, licenses, or technology transfers, we want this cooperation to help us secure markets for our products. To put it in simplified terms: 100 pieces will be manufactured, of which the army will take 10 and the rest will be sold abroad. The profit made on those 90 pieces must cover the cost of the army's 10 pieces. This approach means, first, that the army will be equipped with modern weapons; second, that people will have jobs and money will flow into the state coffers from exports; and, third, that money will be saved that would otherwise be spent on restructuring, unemployment, and so forth."

[Frydl] Will you tell me with the weapons of which domestic firm the Army will be reequipped?

[Baudys] I will not. A quite regular tender will have to take place to determine this. Zbrojovka Cesky Brod is no longer the sole company capable of manufacturing weapons for the Czech Army although, naturally, it is a hot contender. I repeat again: We will have the modernization projects, including priorities, ready by the end of June. Then it will be necessary to conduct a series of talks to determine what we can actually count on. That will be followed by the invitation of tenders and, subsequently, talks with foreign firms. There are areas in which the Czech Republic is traditionally on a top level. One is small arms, the other is aviation technology. The future L-159 fighter plane could become a hit worldwide. Some heavier types of weapons are another area. Here we count on the utilization of our heavy industry, such as Skoda Plzen and others.

Socialist Party Congress Elects Chairman

AU1406200594 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 Jun 94 p 3

[CTK report in the "From the Political Scene" column: "Milan Adam Elected Chairman of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party"]

[Text] Pardubice—Milan Adam, 66, former minister of education in the post-November 1989 government, was elected chairman of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party [CSS] at the 27th CSS Congress in Pardubice. The participants in the congress also approved party statutes and the program of this extraparliamentary party. In the adopted documents, the Socialists have subscribed to the traditions of the CSS since 1897 when the CSS' predecessor "was born of the will of nationally and socially minded workers."

However, the status of legal successor to the pre-November CSS was also claimed by Hirs' Liberal National Social Party [LSNS] when it was founded in May 1993. Unlike the present CSS, the LSNS emphasizes the tradition of Benes' National Social Party.

Talks on European Security Structures

LD1406203694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Excerpt] General M.J. Wilmink, commander of Allied Land Forces in Central Europe, has arrived in Slovakia for a four-day visit. He was welcomed at the Bratislava Milan Rastislav Stefanik Airport by the Slovak Army's Emil Vestenicky. Our collegue Peter Toman reports on General Wilmink's agenda today.

[Toman] General Wilmink was welcomed by the Slovak Army's Lieutenant General Julius Humaj in Trencin this afternoon. He briefed the NATO representatives about the tasks being currently fulfilled by the Slovak Army and also on the transformation in the Army and its command to structures comparable to those of the NATO armies. In the course of their talks, both representatives agreed that the conditions stipulated in the Partnership for Peace program offer a realistic basis for the incorporation of the Slovak Army into the European security structures and thereby, into NATO. [passage omitted]

Bank Officer Cited on Clearing Account

AU1406154794 Bratislava SME in Slovak 11 Jun 94 p 1

["(is)"-signed report: "Abolishing Clearing Is, Perhaps, More To Be Expected From the Czech Side"]

[Text] Bratislava—According to CTK, Economy Minister P. Magvasi has expressed himself in favor of abolishing clearing between Slovakia and the Czech Republic [CR]. He based his statement, among other things, on the positive increase in the two states' foreign currency reserves. In that connection, Deputy Prime Minister B. Schmognerova told CTK that, in a memorandum to the IMF, the Slovak Government committed itself to rendering accounts in convertible currencies in trade with the Czech Republic by the end of 1995 at the latest.

Slovak National Bank (NBS) Deputy Governor M. Jusko has told SME that, officially, the Slovak Republic only declared that it is interested in abolishing the so-called clearing account old-block. Unfortunately, in this context, the two governments have adopted resolutions that are not consistent with each other. M. Jusko sees three possible alternatives. First, that the governments will agree upon an acceptable compromise. Second, that one of the sides will make concessions. The third alternative would be if one of the sides, in harmony with its interests, were to make a sovereign decision and withdraw unilaterally from the payments agreement. According to M. Jusko, the fact that the CR is striving to introduce a fully convertible currency quickly means that interest in abolishing the payments agreement will come more from the Czech side. On the other hand, in view of the fact that the foreign currency reserves are increasing and that measures to liberalize foreign currency relations may be expected, "we also must consider certain steps that do not have to be in harmony with the payments agreement," added M. Jusko.

According to M. Jusko, the situation in clearing is favorable for the NBS at the moment. The overall balance recently amounted to around 44 million ECU in Slovakia's favor.

Council Allocates Sk140 Million for Minorities

AU1406174294 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Jun 94 p 2

[Report by B. Olach: "The Minorities Will Receive 140 Million for Culture"]

[Text] Bratislava—The Government Council for Ethnic Minorities [RVN] convened yesterday for the first time since the formation of the new government three months ago. It dealt with the financial and organizational provisions for culture and education from the point of view of the ethnic minorities.

One result of the meeting was that the ethnic minorities will receive 140 million korunas [Sk] from the state budget this year to promote culture. This is Sk10 million more than last year, while a further Sk10 million has been kept in reserve.

The Council supported all the materials submitted, apart from the Organizational Provisions for Ethnic Minority Education, because they contained some imprecise information. The Council also agreed with optional tuition in Czech as of the next school year. According to the Council's chairman, R. Kovac, it has thus met the demands of the Czech minority, which lives mainly in Bratislava, Trencin, and Kosice. The Ruthenian minority is also demanding that tuition in the Ruthenian language and culture be introduced in the schools attended by ethnic Ruthenian children. According to R. Kovac, deputy prime minister and RVN chairman, the Ruthenians and the Romanies have—apparently—already prepared their languages for codification.

Foreign Trade Figures for Jan-Apr Reported

AU1406093794 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 10 Jun 94 p 8

[TA SR report: "Exports Are Increasing Disproportionately To Imports"]

[Text] The Slovak Republic's foreign trade turnover in the first four months of this year amounted to 121.876 billion korunas [Sk] and, compared with the same period last year, was 16.1 percent higher. The Slovak Republic's foreign trade balance during this period returned a deficit of Sk3.368 billion in trading parity (OP). According to the analysis made available by the Slovak Statistical Office, Slovak exports amounted to Sk59.254 billion and, compared with the first four months of 1993,

they have increased by 13.8 percent. Slovak imports amounted to Sk62.622 billion, which is an increase of 18.5 percent compared with the same period last year.

Germany After the Czech Republic

Exports to the Czech Republic accounted for 38 percent of overall Slovak exports. The figure for the Federal Republic of Germany was 17.4 percent; for the Hungarian Republic, 5.6 percent; and for Austria, 5.2 percent. Slovakia's other foreign customers were Italy—4.1 percent; the Russian Federation—3.8 percent; Poland—2.4 percent; France—1.9 percent; Ukraine and the United States—1.8 percent each; and the Kingdom of the Netherlands—1.7 percent.

Compared with the same period last year, exports to the FRG rose by 46.3 percent; to Austria by 29.9 percent; and to Italy by 91 percent. Exports to the Russian Federation increased by 10 percent; to the Polish Republic by 13 percent; to France by 44.4 percent; and to the United States by 121.4 percent. On the other hand, exports from the Slovak Republic to the Czech Republic declined by 6.3 percent; to Ukraine by 36.5 percent; to China by 86.6 percent; to Romania by 41.4 percent; and to Bulgaria by 49.8 percent.

As in exports from Slovakia, the Czech Republic also had the largest share in Slovak imports—30.6 percent; the Russian Federation—20.6 percent; the Federal Republic of Germany—11.9 percent; the Republic of Austria—5.6 percent; the Republic of Italy—3.8 percent; the United States—2.8 percent; the Republic of France—2.4 percent; the Polish Republic 2.3 percent; and Ukraine—2.0 percent.

Imports From the United States Have Increased

Compared with the same period last year, imports from the Russian Federation were higher—by 22.7 percent; from the Federal Republic of Germany—by 47.3 percent; and from the Republic of Italy—by 70.5 percent. Compared with the first four months of last year, imports from the United States also increased—by 147.5 percent; from France—by 136.4 percent; from Japan—by 67 percent; from Poland—by 44.8 percent; from Hungary—by 45.7 percent; and from Holland—by 3.8 percent. On the other hand, imports from the Czech Republic declined by 9.1 percent; from Ukraine—by 10.2 percent; from Austria—by 0.6 percent; and from Romania—by 34.5 percent.

The Slovak Republic achieved a deficit balance with individual economic groupings, especially in relation to the states of the European Free Trade Association—Sk1.33 billion (OP), Sk390 million (OP) of which was with the Republic of Austria. Slovakia had a deficit balance of Sk10.702 billion (OP) with the Russian Federation and of Sk190 million (OP) with Ukraine.

On the other hand, during this period, the Slovak Republic had a surplus balance with European Union—of Sk2.276 billion (OP). The Slovak Republic had a surplus balance of Sk5.558 billion (OP) with regard to the CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Agreement] states. Of this, it had a surplus balance of Sk3.363 billion with the Czech Republic and of Sk2.369 billion (OP) with Hungary.

Select Categories of Products

Mineral fuels, mineral oils, resinous materials and wax, and also boilers, machinery, equipment and parts for nuclear reactors, electronic audio-visual recording and reproduction equipment, motorized vehicles, tractors, motorcycles and equipment, iron and steel products, optical instruments, photographic equipment, measuring and medical instruments, iron and steel, plastics and plastic products, pharmaceutical and organic chemical products, metallic ores, slag and clinker, paper, cartons, and adhesives were predominant in Slovak imports. These select categories of products accounted for 66.9 percent of Slovak imports.

Iron, steel, boilers, machinery, equipment and parts for nuclear reactors, motorized vehicles, tractors, motorcycles and equipment, plastics and plastic products, mineral fuels, mineral oils, resinous materials, waxes, electronic audio-visual recording and reproduction equipment, iron and steel products, wood, wooden products, charcoal, chemical, synthetic, and man-made fabrics, organic chemical products, paper, cartons, furniture, bedding textiles, lighting fittings, and modular structures were predominant in Slovak exports. These select categories of products also accounted for 66.9 percent of overall exports from Slovakia.

MSZP-SZDSZ Coalition Talks Continue

MSZP's Szekeres Comments

AU1406101694 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 11 Jun 94 p 13

[Interview with Imre Szekeres, deputy executive chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Tibor Moldovanyi; place and date not given: "We Are Striving for Long-Term Political Activity"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Moldovanyi] The Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] repeatedly stressed that they would ask for guarantees from the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] for the implementation of equal governing. What guarantees can you give them without risking the implementation of your own program?

[Szekeres] Negotiations about these issues have just begun and, obviously, both sides will modify their concepts in the course of the negotiations. At the talks held on 9 June, 80-85 percent of the two parties' positions were identical. In the course of practical implementation, I think the most important thing is to create a joint government. This could create confidence which, together with the guarantees, will assure an effective government. We must work out the mechanism of seeking a consensus on both economic and political levels. Cooperation between parties, factions, and officials involved in government must be assured.

[Moldovanyi] You are heading the MSZP negotiating group in the committee of experts dealing with the government structure. What basic principles do you want to focus on in the course of the agreement with the SZDSZ?

[Szekeres] First of all, I would like to stress that I can only mention concrete things after the decision of the committee, because the negotiating partners agreed on the fact that they should not learn about each other's views from the press. The starting point of the MSZP is that the government should be smaller in size. This means a government of 12-14 persons, with one minister without portfolio at most. Of course, we would also like to reduce the number of national offices. According to our plans, the Office of the Prime Minister will be the government coordination body. This will guarantee internal coordination within the government. A considerable ministerial independence and responsibility would be asserted in this system. Efficiency and cooperation between various ministries are the main goals. [passage omitted]

[Moldovanyi] Will prime minister Gyula Horn have a veto right over the ministerial candidates of the SZDSZ?

[Szekeres] The mechanism of coalition cooperation has not yet been clarified. It is certain, however, that it is the right of the prime minister to appoint ministers. The Constitution guarantees him this right, but a lot depends on the agreement of coalition partners. [passage omitted]

[Moldovanyi] In the course of the election campaign, the MSZP stressed the expertise. In several election forums, Gyula Horn pointed out that he would welcome in the new government persons who used to be ministers in the former Nemeth-cabinet or before that. However, the end of the Nemeth-cabinet did not only mean a change in the regime but also the departure of those whose policy failed. Will they now come back?

[Szekeres] I think it is a mistake to compare the former regime with the Nemeth cabinet, because the latter prepared the transition. The decisions on appointing ministers are still to be made, and we will also have to take into account the government structure. I am sure, however, that there will be ministers who were also members of the Nemeth cabinet, but a younger generation will also emerge. We are striving for a long-term political activity, and people who have been in the background will have to obtain governing experience at the level of state secretaries for example. It is obvious, however, that we are not talking about the restoration of the Nemeth cabinet. [passage omitted]

SZDSZ's Peto Views Talks

AU1406121094 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 11 Jun 94 p 13

[Interview with Ivan Peto, chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Noemi Sumegi; place and date not given: "The Details Will Not Be Published Later, Either—Ivan Peto on the Deputy Prime Ministerial Post, the Need To Prove, and the Cohabitation Agreement"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Sumegi] Before the elections, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] often mentioned the lack of unity in the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], and that your cooperation with them would depend a lot on which of these forces would dominate in the MSZP.

[Peto] During the talks, it has become clear that the MSZP's coalition intention is serious and this cannot at the moment be doubted by the SZDSZ. The coalition will obviously increase the chance that policies that are acceptable to the SZDSZ prevail in the country, and it is no secret that this was one of the factors that influenced us. Therefore, if we had and have worries about the possible existence of various intentions in the MSZP, we will be able to influence these intentions through the coalition. I do not think that this needs to be kept secret. [passage omitted]

[Sumegi] You have often mentioned the example of Germany, where the Free Democrats, in spite of their few mandates, occupy an important position in the government. Is it possible that the SZDSZ will get the positions of foreign minister, interior minister, and justice minister in Hungary?

[Peto] If we only looked at the speculation then the whole government would belong to us because it has

already been suggested regardomg all ministries that we insist on having it. We do not wish to talk about this in public during the talks. [passage omitted]

[Sumegi] Returning to the German example, is it possible that, whoever acquires majority, the SZDSZ can always be a governmental factor?

[Peto] Hungarian political life consists of three lines and practically none of the political forces can form a government on its own—although the MSZP has now acquired the absolute majority. I assume that this situation will be prolonged and that a similar landslide-like victory cannot be expected at the next elections. Therefore, at least two forces will always have to work together. The SZDSZ is a serious factor in political life and, at the next elections, it can be one of the parties that will choose coalition partners.

[Sumegi] Do you even think cooperation with the conservative parties possible?

[Peto] On the basis of statements made by some leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], I assume that there is a chance that the MDF will conduct moderate politics in opposition. It is not necessary for our relations to remain the way they have been in the past few years. I can imagine that the Hungarian political life will be like the German one where there are joining points between the various political forces. [passage omitted]

[Sumegi] The SZDSZ, which has so far been open about its politics, appears to be more hostile to the press.

[Peto] We consider it extremely important to inform the public but we also have other obligations. If our convention had been public then our debate could not have been so open. A decision that will determine a party's life in the long run does not necessarily have to be made before the public, and the same applies to the coalition talks. The negotiations would not achieve their objective if we were also trying to adapt to the needs of publicity. [passage omitted]

SZDSZ's Magyar on Progress in Talks

AU1406145194 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 14 Jun 94 p 4

["Sz.Sz."-signed interview with Balint Magyar, executive chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats; place and date not given: "People Cannot Legally Be Made To Adhere to the Coalition Agreement"]

[Text] I dare say that it was not us who spent the most money on the election campaign, Balint Magyar told MAGYAR HIRLAP. We also interviewed Magyar, member of the coalition negotiating team of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], on the planned agreement and the chances of the negotiations.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] What is the guarantee that the coalition partners will adhere to the contents of the agreement that is to be made?

[Magyar] The coalition agreement is a political arrangement and of course no one can be forced by legal measures to adhere to it. The agreement is valid while the sides observe it. If someone violates the agreement, this means that he no longer wishes to govern together with the partner. In this case, the coalition can collapse. The coalition agreement establishes the conditions for joint governmental decisionmaking, the implementation of the jointly made decisions, and joint responsibility for these.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Many people might believe that the coalition talks have been halted because, according to the indications, you did not manage to make any progress on 12 June.

[Magyar] The views are constantly being brought closer together and the number of disputed issues is being reduced all the time. With Imre Szekeres, executive chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], we are continuously coordinating the text on the mechanisms and guarantees of joint governmental work. There is no need at all for concern; even in Germany, the coalition talks last two to four weeks although they already have established mechanisms for such talks.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Is it possible that you will manage to agree on the guarantees today or this week?

[Magyar] I would not exclude this possibility.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Between the two rounds of the elections, you said that the MSZP would exclude the possibility of coalition cooperation with the SZDSZ if it named [MSZP Chairman] Gyula Horn as prime ministerial candidate. Did this cause any problems in the negotiations?

[Magyar] Both parties acted independently when they set up the negotiating delegations for the coalition talks. I find it perfectly natural that neither side interfered in the other side's selection of the delegation members or in determining its size. As for the quoted statement, a fundamentally different situation arose after the second round of the elections because the MSZP acquired a 54 percent majority in Parliament. According to the surveys, the majority of the MSZP's and SZDSZ's voters are committed supporters of the two parties' coalition, and the Socialists made a coalition offer to us. All these made it perfectly clear for us that we had to enter the coalition talks.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] As one of the SZDSZ's influential politicians, do you have governmental desires, would you accept a nomination for some kind of governmental position?

[Magyar] I have already said many times that I do not have such ambitions. I have not changed this view. As a matter of fact, participation in the coalition talks does

not necessarily mean that the person in question wishes to take a role in the new government.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] According to assessments published in the press, the SZDSZ had spent the most money on the election campaign. According to certain information, the party has serious debts. I am asking you, as the SZDSZ's campaign chief, what is true from all this?

[Magyar] The SZDSZ does not have serious debts. As a matter of fact, the assessments of campaign costs did not contain the costs of certain advertisement carriers. The SZDSZ used the amount that is had at its disposal during the campaign rather efficiently. I dare say that it was not us who spent the most money on the campaign but at least two parties were ahead of us in this.

Foreign Ministry Possibilities Noted

AU1406112594 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 11 Jun 94 p 7

[Interview with Laszlo Kovacs, member of the National Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Gabor Lambert; place and date not given: "We Can Envisage a Coalition-Led Foreign Ministry"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Lambert] There is really little difference between the foreign and security policy programs of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]. Starting from this premise, can you envisage a Foreign Ministry leadership in which coalition factors are asserted?

[Kovacs] I could envisage such a leadership. It is true that there are no basic differences between the two programs regarding the main goals, the mentality, the means, or the style. I can envisage a leadership in the Foreign Ministry in which one party provides the minister and the other the political state secretary, although the statements by the MSZP so far are generally in favor of "one-colour" ministries. My personal opinion is that in some cases dual leadership is perhaps more comfortable, namely that the minister and the political state secretary do not belong to the same party. One can also envisage a solution in which one party has the position of minister and the other party the position of chairman of Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee. I know from experience—because I have filled this position for the last one and a half years—that the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee also has an opportunity to influence foreign policy.

[Lambert] Looking at the recent past, we can say that the Foreign Ministry was under the strong influence of the prime minister. Now, if we start from the premise that Gyula Horn will be the prime minister, a politician who has serious diplomatic experience, how will this be reflected in the leadership of the Foreign Ministry?

[Kovacs] In most countries, the prime minister takes an active part in shaping and implementing foreign policy. There are a lot of summit meetings, including NATO meetings, meetings in the NATO Cooperation Council, meetings between the European Union and the associate members, the Western European Union, and the CSCE, meetings in which the prime minister has to participate. Prime ministerial meetings also represent the summit in bilateral relations. As for Gyula Horn, he has indeed spent most of his life in the area of foreign relations. If I became the head of the Foreign Ministry, this would not be a problem for me, because I have been working with Gyula Horn together for many years, and we understand each other well, and I think we also complement each other. [passage omitted]

[Lambert] The programs of both the SZDSZ and the MSZP carry the proposal to incorporate the Ministry of International Economic Relations into the organizational framework of the Foreign Ministry. What are the chances of such a development now when increasing exports is one of the major tasks of our economic policy, and the aforementioned ministry could play a role in this?

[Kovacs] Actually, in its current form, the Ministry of International Economic Relations has become obsolete. Foreign trade is no longer a monopoly and this ministry lost a series of functions that used to be important in the past. Therefore, I think it is logical to envisage the incorporation of some of the tasks of this ministry into a future "economic top ministry," and some other tasks into the Industry Ministry and the Trade Ministry, and the foreign activity should come under the authority of the Foreign Ministry, as is the case in most countries. In this case, the current commercial representations abroad would be incorporated into the respective embassies.

[Lambert] If I am correct, the National Information Office is already considering a possible halt in its activity. Could you confirm that this is also an MSZP view?

[Kovacs] The MSZP has not yet examined the situation of various government offices and government-affiliated offices. My personal opinion is that the activity carried out by the National Information Office in recent months only harmed Hungary's international evaluation, so it is certain that this body cannot function in its current form and with its current personnel.

[Lambert] How do you envisage the contacts with the Hungarians living beyond our borders?

[Kovacs] Support for the Hungarians living beyond our borders in their endeavor to receive constitutional and legal guarantees for their rights is one of the major directions of activity in the foreign policy concepts of the MSZP. Thus, it is absolutely natural that the government must be ready for close cooperation. We must, however, develop these contacts without discrimination, namely with all the legitimate organizations of Hungarians in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Vojvodina, Croatia, and Slovenia, and not only with parties, trends, and personalities that are politically and ideologically

close to the Hungarian government. Unfortunately, this has been the practice in the past four years. [passage omitted]

[Lambert] As chairman of Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, you repeatedly criticized the Foreign Ministry for failing to provide sufficient information about the diplomatic steps under consideration. From your own experience, how do you envisage future parliamentary control over the Foreign Ministry?

[Kovacs] I have indeed criticized relations between the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Affairs Committee, but I also recognized the fact that these relations have steadily improved in the past four years, as we have learned the laws of a multiparty parliamentary democracy, both government party members and opposition members. We had to learn what it means to be a government party member and an opposition member and how to tolerate each other's situation and views to a certain extent. In view of these experiences, I believe things will work better in the next parliamentary cycle, because the MSZP and the SZDSZ—the two parties that will now form a government coalition—have opposition experience, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]—parties that will now be in the opposition—also have governing experience. Therefore, we have a mutually better understanding of each other's situation. [passage omitted]

Foreign Policy Plans Compared

AU1406182594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 14 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Laszlo M. Lengyel: "There Are No Major Differences in the Foreign Policy Programs"]

[Text] The coordination of the foreign policy programs of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] starts today within the framework of the ongoing coalition negotiations. Comparing the documents, we can say that there are few actual differences between them. The foreign policy section of the negotiations will be mostly a field of expert coordination, rather than political fighting. Neither of the programs is an ideological one; they can be clearly called pragmatic, and both are based on international realities and interests.

Both parties regard European integration and neighborhood policy as the cornerstones of Hungary's foreign policy attitude, and this provides the goals of our foreign economic, security, integration, and national minority policies.

The SZDSZ regards full NATO membership as the most important concluding moment of integration; the MSZP puts Hungary's membership in the European Union in first place. Therefore, the MSZP regards the Partnership for Peace program as an adequate step on the road leading to the NATO, stressing that this strengthens the confidence of the countries in our region toward each other and creates the conditions for the NATO-compatibility of the Hungarian defense forces. The SZDSZ does not emphasize the importance of the Partnership stage so clearly. The MSZP would use a referendum in the matter of NATO membership, but this is not so clearly formulated in the SZDSZ program.

Both the MSZP and the SZDSZ are aware of the fact that the conditions of economic, political, and security policies and military alliance cooperation with Europe must be primarily created within Hungary itself; a hasty and unprepared integration would cause serious damage to our economy. It is impossible to start a "competition" in this process in our region and get a more favorable position than others; at the same time, we must be aware of the fact that Hungary has recently been present in Western considerations "according to its weight" and, although this might give the impression of devaluation, this is actually not the case. However, the unsettled relations with our neighbors is a factor that hinders integration and it harms the measure of our acceptance. Looking at it from both directions, it is important to create a modernized and attractive Hungary, a desirable partner.

The differences derive from the political habits and cadres of the two parties. Foreign policy has traditionally been a success area of the MSZP and, along with Gyula Horn, Laszlo Kovacs, and Csaba Tabajdi, numerous other theoretical and practical experts, former ambassadors, and foreign officials can now be employed. The SZDSZ-shop led by Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, with its straight strategic line that puts greater emphasis on principles, will emerge along with the MSZP foreign policy that will probably be able to react to the changes with great security.

In Csaba Tabajdi, the MSZP has a considerable expert on the international standards on the issue of ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders and the national minority issue in general. The Tabajdi-group clearly declared the principle of "national minority rights in exchange for the border clause," which does not contradict the idea of the Szent-Ivanyi group according to which "Hungary does not have any territorial demands that can be implemented; nor can it have such demands; however, guaranteeing national minority rights is clearly a European norm." It is a matter of taste which of these has more argument value and which is more idealistic, or more practical. (One can also mention here a pseudo-argument, but the issue can also be interpreted in the way that the border issue on the other side, and the situation of national minorities on the Hungarian side received a psychological weight that led to the development of a real situation of something in exchange for something else). Differences mostly emerge in the clear stand in favor of the autonomy concept of the ethnic Hungarian minorities, because this appears more clearly in the MSZP. The fact that both parties think in terms of contributing to the social and economic modernization of the neighboring countries, economic contacts that

improve the situation of ethnic Hungarian minorities and generally the bilateral relations, including the legal conditions (investment protection, avoiding double taxation, and the creation of special economic zones) takes away the strength of possible debates. The MSZP is more in favor of a basic treaty with an adequate content, formulation, and guarantees; the SZDSZ, however, regards the treaties an important, albeit not outstanding, element of the means of our neighborhood policy.

MSZP's Bekesi Wants 'Ideology-Free' Policies

94CH0285A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 19 May 94 pp 1, 14-15

[Interview with Laszlo Bekesi, parliamentary representative and economic expert of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Dr. Gyorgy Varga; place and date not given]

[Text] [Varga] Laszlo Csaba's most important thesis is that economic policy could again become subordinated to power issues, and this could lead to a breakup, a fragmentation of economic policy. Is this concern warranted?

[Bekesi] The concern is not unfounded, but it is avoidable. I dare assert this so plainly because we are after the first round of elections, and two parties of the opposition won, both of which are ready to free the economy from an ideological-political domination.

If a government coalition composed of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] wants to complete its four-year term, in the present situation of the country it cannot neglect focusing its attention and energy on the economy. One cannot initiate new discussions about the coat of arms and new gestures of retribution and compensation. The crisis must be attended to, the prerequisites for economic growth must be created, the deterioration of the balance must be stopped, and the country must finally be put on a track of modernization. Thus, a socialist-liberal government will be under constraint. In the current situation there is simply no alternative to a pragmatic, ideology-free economic policy. I stress this because I largely agree with Laszlo Csaba that the economic policy of the past year and a half was characterized by distribution. This was an election-year economic policy. The new government must concentrate on creating the prerequisites for income production, and unfortunately, this presupposes a series of decisions which are painful for the entire society.

[Varga] Is the establishment of a ministry for economic affairs a necessary prerequisite for preventing the fragmentation and atomization of economic policy?

[Bekesi] From the aspect of the issue under discussion I do not consider it crucial. It is more important to create within the government the personal and organizational framework of a unified economic policy. This can happen through the establishment of a ministry, but the coordination is also possible through the person of a deputy prime minister with a strong expertise and sufficient political support, or in the form of an efficiently directed economic cabinet. Of course, a prime minister who is an expert on economic policy can also present a solution. In other words, the main issue is to prevent having several centers of economic policy within the government.

[Varga] The country's economic situation would justify having an individual well versed in economic issues at the head of the government.

[Bekesi] I agree, but this ought to be discussed during the coalition talks.

[Varga] The next source of danger is that the management of the crisis and the protection of jobs puts the protectionist instinct of defense in the foreground. Is this trap unavoidable?

[Bekesi] I share Laszlo Csaba's fears, even though in the course of the campaign only parties with extremist, populist agendas were in favor of a protectionist economic policy aiming at an exaggerated protection of the Hungarian market.

The MSZP and the SZDSZ excluded protectionist measures from the arsenal of fostering the domestic market. Still, I must add that with the current capability of the Hungarian economy to compete on the international market, it would be suicidal to allow complete freedom to market forces. Incidentally, it is not done in that way anywhere in the world. The frameworks of agreements with the European Union and GATT will provide adequate protection for the Hungarian economy in the critical segments of the market. Namely, the Hungarian Government is entitled to institute measures for the protection of the market up to 10 percent of the country's yearly imports. This possibility must be utilized skillfully. This figure concerns imports to the value of $1-1.2 billion, which is a considerable sum. Thus, in this amount, one may utilize the possibilities afforded by customs, contingents, quotas, and technical specifications. It is a fact that up to now the government did not fully utilize this 10-percent limit of market protection. A new government must do this much and not more.

[Varga] In connection with the protection of the nation's land and the peculiar implementation of consumer protection, Laszlo Csaba mentions the dangers inherent in an exaggerated, economically irrational, protection of agriculture.

[Bekesi] The strategic purpose of economic policy must be to restore, and establish the competitiveness of, agriculture and food industry. That is to say, the improvement of the position of the agricultural-food industry complex is a stabilizing factor for the economy and is one of the prerequisites for economic growth. I am convinced that within a short time, with relatively little investment, the greatest growth of productivity might be achieved in this branch of the economy.

As far as the ownership of land is concerned, in the short run it is unavoidable to exclude foreign capital, but in the long run it would be a mistake. In other words, it is only justified to forbid foreign ownership of land until a market for land and realistic land prices are established. However, within a foreseeable time period the land market will begin to grow, because the estates which were formed are so small that they do not allow competitive farming. In other words, under pressure, we will soon witness the beginning of a concentration process. As a result, realistic market prices for land will be established. At that time, the prohibition of land ownership by foreigners must be abolished.

As far as agrarian subsidies are concerned, the 30-40 percent level which has been established in Europe is an unrealistic goal for us. In Hungary the subsidy is currently 7-8 percent. This also plays a role in the huge decline in production. It is without precedent that in our exports we were unable to fulfill the contingent allowed by the European Union. In my opinion, in the course of four years the level of subsidy can be doubled, i.e., it can be increased to 15 percent. This will mean 120 billion forints [Ft] a year, compared to the current Ft60-70 billion.

[Varga] Is this a straight subsidy?

[Bekesi] Not at all. I am thinking primarily of preferential interest rates for agricultural investments, procurement intervention by the state to restore a minimal level of production security, procurement guarantees, and the introduction of guaranteed procurement prices in the area of basic produce. The latter would not be the market price, rather a minimal price. Thus, one must anticipate the increase of producers' prices. And in the case of some articles—when our export interests require—we must provide subsidies. It is a fact that these measures will create inflationary pressure.

[Varga] Laszlo Csaba wrote that a financial system was created, the viability of which depended on the goodwill of the central power and not on its effectiveness on the market. How can this situation be changed?

[Bekesi] My answer in one sentence: by privatizing banks as soon as possible, by concurrently increasing their capital.

[Varga] Can you already name some measures to be introduced during the new government's "honeymoon"?

[Bekesi] The future coalition government should focus its energies on the implementation of two goals: The first one is the creation of the prerequisites for growth, and the second one is an increase in employment. There are, however, two difficult challenges before the realization of these two goals: One is the balance, or rather, the lack of balance, between internal and external finances, and the other one is the danger of hyperinflation. In other words, the aforementioned goals must be realized by maneuvering between these two challenges, while at the same time preserving social harmony.

The most urgent task is to stop the dramatic deterioration of the external and internal economic balance. If this does not take place, the country's financial security will be endangered in 1995. Urgent measures must be taken to stop the decrease of exports. To achieve this goal, the principle of neutrality must be exercised in exchange rate policy, i.e., we must avoid reacting too late to a revaluation of the forint; decided steps must be taken to recapture eastern markets; export-oriented projects must be supported within the framework of the tax system. Overspending by the state must be restrained. The increase of the budget deficit in relation to the GDP must be stopped. It is important to have at least as much in domestic savings to finance the debt in order to offset the consolidated deficit. Today, the gap between domestic savings and the deficit is approximately Ft100 billion. In 1995 this will be untenable. If the GDP cannot be increased in 1995, the expenses of the budget must be reduced. A "cut" of Ft50 billion must already be made in the supplementary budget to be prepared in 1994.

[Varga] The situation would certainly be alleviated if the privatization of large state-owned firms, such as the Hungarian Telecommunications Enterprise [Matav] and the Hungarian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation [Mol], continued in a more determined fashion.

[Bekesi] I agree with you, but this continuation should take place in the framework of a new privatization strategy, namely, a privatization method involving the increase of capital must be implemented.

[Varga] You stressed several times, and this time as well, the importance of returning to the eastern markets. How realistic is this return for us?

[Bekesi] As a strategy, based on the natural order of the international division of labor, the return is unavoidable. This is hardly disputed by now. What can be disputed is what can be achieved and how, and whether today or tomorrow. On the markets in question there is great demand, but their financial situation is bad. In other words, beyond conventional trade methods we must exploit the possibilities of barter, such as raw materials for food. Furthermore, it is in our strategic interests to participate in the privatization of these countries. We must acquire property; considerable capacities and property can be acquired very cheaply nowadays. For instance, in return for export goods, for as yet not expended Hungarian credit balances, or in the framework of joint ownership.

[Varga] Foreign capital was not pleased that the government abolished the system of normative preferences and awarded state preferences in connection with the investment of foreign capital on the basis of individual agreements. Do you think change is warranted?

[Bekesi] By all means. The MSZP is determined to restore the system of normative preferences for foreign and Hungarian investors. The retention of the right to

make individual decisions by the government would only maintain an atmosphere of suspicion and the possibility of abuse.

[Varga] You said in a recent interview that genuine economic measures can only take place in September. Is this acceptable in the current economic situation?

[Bekesi] I uphold my opinion that genuine economic measures can take place in September at the earliest. Namely, the new government can be formed at the beginning of July. The announcement of the government's program can occur at the earliest at the end of July; in August, bills can be prepared which the government can submit to parliament in September.

On the other hand, urgent decisions cannot be postponed until September. For instance, the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] can make monetary decisions concerning the balance of payments. Adjustments in the exchange rate can take place any time, based on an authorization by the government. A huge amount of state bonds are stored in the safes of the central bank which could be, or should be, used as a means of restricting liquidity. If it is advisable, the central bank can raise the prime rate. Furthermore, after the end of June, the coalition partners can ask the acting government to make justified and urgent economic decisions. For instance, to freeze spending budget reserves, suspend subsidies to decentralized funds beyond the prorated amount, and stop injurious privatization measures, such as the KRP [expansion unknown].

[Varga] Finally, I return to Laszlo Csaba, who pointed out the dangers inherent in the trilateral arbitration mechanism. However, both the MSZP and the SZDSZ intend to construct such a social mechanism. Are you not afraid that this would slow down economic decision-making and diminish the economy's ability to adjust?

[Bekesi] In Hungary's current situation, in the given political-economic situation, when crisis management is necessary, when a series of unpopular measures must be instituted, when a policy of savings and investment stimulation must be conducted, and not a policy of distribution, an argumentation of economic rationalism can hardly suffice to convince society of the necessity of these measures. However, social harmony is indispensable for the implementation of such a program. If it cannot be protected, the Polish effect comes into action. Here, under the current circumstances, the prerequisites for preserving social harmony can only be established within the framework of a system of arbitration. It is to be expected that the three partners participating in the arbitration—the employees, the employers, and the state—will not put an emphasis on distribution, and will not fight about who should receive a relatively larger slice of the shrinking cake, but rather endeavor to make the cake as large as possible. The state must lead the way in self-restraint, but the other two partners can also be expected to exhibit similar behavior, especially in the first period of the government cycle. Thus, the coalition must from time to time persuade its two social partners.

I think in the beginning this will be very difficult, because it requires self-restraint from the participants. I don't deny that I am expecting big discussions and fights, but I am convinced that with a social-liberal coalition, there is a chance for agreement.

ΩViews of Party Supporters Polled

94P20867A

[Editorial Report]

MSZP Voters Found To Oppose Reform

Polling voters of the parties that ran in the May election, the Hungarian Gallup Institute found that supporters of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)—which won an absolute majority, with 209 of a total of 386, of the parliamentary seats—are considerably more likely to oppose economic reform and are less tolerant of minorities than supporters of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), which the MSZP has invited to become its coalition partner. According to the findings, MSZP supporters are also far less inclined to favor economic reform than supporters of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the main party of the defeated right-of-center government, while the views of MSZP and MDF voters differ little in terms of social tolerance. Published in the 2 June issue of the Budapestweekly BESZELO, the poll was conducted 21-23 May between the two rounds of election balloting and reflects views expressed on a questionnaire by 1500 Hungarians "representing all voting-age inhabitants of the country nationwide." Although 15 parties ran in the election, the poll results published in BESZELO pertain mainly to the six parties that made it into parliament by getting at least 5 percent of the vote, the threshold set by law.

Gallup Official's Commentary

In the commentary accompanying the data, Hungarian Gallup official Gyorgy Fischer suggested that the voters' dislike of economic reform played a key role in determining the outcome of the election and that this antireform attitude may undermine the stability of any MSZP-SZDSZ governing coalition. "The most promarket voting camps," Fischer noted, "are those of the MDF and the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz)," the parties that lost the most—MDF dropping to 38 seats from 159 in the 1990 election, and Fidesz barely surmounting the 5-percent barrier into parliament with 20 seats, even though for a time last year it had led popularity polls.

At the same time, Fischer indicated, the fact that voters of the SZDSZ—which came in a distant second to the MSZP, with 69 seats—support a market economy "to a great degree" suggests that if the MSZP and SZDSZ form a coalition, the two parties' leaders will be under conflicting pressures from their respective constituents.

Voters of the two parties are "far from each other" on key economic issues, Fischer stressed. "SZDSZ voters are characterized by a promarket attitude and almost completely lack support for the redistribution of wealth by the state," while "in contrast, the MSZP's voting base is characterized by strong hostility to the market and supports on a large scale the idea of redistribution."

Views on Economic Reform

The contrast between MSZP voters and supporters of the other parties was sharpest on the question of whether private property should be dominant, with only 18 percent of MSZP voters saying they agree, as opposed to the following percentages for other parties: SZDSZ, 40; MDF, 40; Independent Smallholders Party, 49; Christian Democratic People's Party, 34; and Fidesz, 37. Conversely, 43 percent of MSZP voters rejected outright the proposition that private property should be dominant, while the percentages for the other parties are significantly lower: SZDSZ, 22; MDF, 28; Smallholders, 21; Christian Democrats, 24; and Fidesz, 30. The antireform attitudes of MSZP voters was shown, for example, by the fact that only 22 percent of them agree that "unprofitable enterprises must be allowed to go bankrupt." This is well below the percentages for other parties: SZDSZ, 30; MDF, 44; Smallholders, 30; Christian Democrats, 33; and Fidesz, 38. Conversely, the following percentages disagreed with allowing bankruptcy: MSZP, 47; SZDSZ, 41; MDF, 33; Smallholders, 42; Christian Democrats, 39; and Fidesz, 37.

Only on one question, asking whether respondents agreed "that Market competition should be limited," did supporters of another party, the Christian Democrats, score higher than those of the MSZP in opposing reform. The breakdown in the "agree" column was as follows: MSZP, 45; SZDSZ, 37; MDF, 35; Smallholders, 43; Christian Democrats, 53; and Fidesz, 37. The percentages in the "disagree" column were MSZP, 24; SZDSZ, 36; MDF, 41; Smallholders, 25; Christian Democrats, 23; and Fidesz, 36.

Although the aggregate data indicated that the MDF and Fidesz voters are the most consistently promarket, Fischer noted, the survey showed that on "attitudes toward the redistribution of wealth and toward the market," the MSZP and the SZDSZ are the most sharply divided. The desire to increase the state's role in redistributing wealth "is least characteristic of the Smallholders and SZDSZ," while "social envy and the desire for redistribution are by far the most characteristic of MSZP voters," he said.

Social Tolerance

The poll indicated that among Hungarian voters there is little correlation between socialist economic attitudes and social tolerance. According to Fischer, the aggregate data show that, along with Smallholders voters, supporters of the MSZP are "more intolerant than the average," while the "most tolerant" voters are supporters of the SZDSZ—indicating that, as in the case of economic reform, the respective voters of the MSZP and the SZDSZ have "radically" different views, which could strain a coalition between the two parties. Fischer noted that this difference in social attitudes is also "what sharply separates the SZDSZ from the Smallholders, to which it is so close in terms of economic attitudes." At the same time, the data indicate that the Christian Democrat camp, which stands closest to the MSZP in socialist economic views, comes closest to the liberal SZDSZ in social tolerance.

The Gallup Institute's survey provided a breakdown of voter attitudes toward three groups: Gypsies, Jews, and "people of color." The survey indicated that about half of the population, with only an 8-percentage point spread among the parties, has "an aversion to Gypsies": MSZP, 47; SZDSZ, 46; MDF, 49; Smallholders, 52; Christian Democrats, 44; Fidesz, 44. Responses to a question about anti-Semitism, on the other hand, suggest that hostility to Jews is far less prevalent than toward Gypsies, with socialist voters more inclined to anti-Semitic views than supporters of the liberal parties, SZDSZ and Fidesz, and more than supporters of the three right-of-center parties. Percentages of those who said that they "dislike Jews" are as follows: MSZP, 15; SZDSZ, 7; MDF, 10; Smallholders, 13; Christian Democrats, 10; and Fidesz, 10. The MSZP was in the middle of the pack, however, on the topic of racial tolerance. Asked if "it would be better to limit the number of people of color in this country," the following percentages of party voters answered in the affirmative: MSZP, 30; SZDSZ, 27; MDF, 27; Smallholders, 35; Christian Democrats, 31; and Fidesz, 34.

Efforts Made To Halt Illegal Border Traffic

94CH0281A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 16 May 94 p 14

[Article by Krisztina Koenen: "Migration of Nations on New Paths; Smugglers of Illegal Immigrants in the Sight of the Hungarian Border Protection Service"]

[Text] Budapest, Spring—A group of about 20 Russians some time ago caught the eye of the Hungarian border protection authorities in the vicinity of Miskole in the northeast border area: They seemingly had traveled aimlessly back and forth by railway. When the group had found accommodations in a cheap hotel, surveillance was begun. It was observed that one man in the group—evidently in expectation of a call—appeared every day at the same time at a public telephone capable of receiving incoming calls. The border protection service also determined that the passports of the suspicious Russians without exception were issued at the same time and by the same agency. The group had entered from Ukraine by hitch-hiking, because no pedestrians are cleared at the border crossing that it used. Little by little all members of the group left the hotel in the direction of western Hungary; they drove to Gyoer, the largest city in the vicinity of the Austrian border. There, together with their observers, they continued to wait. Ten days later

the impatiently awaited escorters turned up. Their vehicles, a Lada and a minibus, bore license plates from the Czech city of Teplitz. The group prepared to continue its journey when at last the Hungarian border protection service intervened and brought to light some surprising things. The leader of the escorters was a Georgian, the remaining smugglers of illegal immigrants were Czechs and Hungarians. One of the Czechs had been known to the border protection service for a long time. He had already been expelled from the country once, not quite a year ago, because of smuggling human beings and illegal border crossings. In the end, 32 adults were arrested, to whom belonged more than 20 children. Not one of them was a Russian: All of them came from Afghanistan. They had purchased the Russian passports in Moscow for 200 marks [DM] each from a Georgian at Vnukovo Airport—no forgeries, but originals with fictitious names. The destination of the group was Germany. North of Teplitz they were to be infiltrated into Bavaria.

This story from the Hungarian magazine MAGYAR NARANCS shows how quickly and fundamentally border protection organizations of the former socialist countries had to change their way of thinking. Before the change, the chief occupation of the Hungarian border protection service, which at that time consisted of conscripts, was securing the western border against escape attempts from Hungary in the direction of Austria and—to a lesser degree—Yugoslavia. Today prospective Hungarian travelers have a passport issued to them, and the Austrian border is watched by the Austrians themselves. On the Hungarian side there are no longer protective strips or electronic alarm fences.

Today the Hungarian guards control and protect first of all the borders of the former socialist camp, which previously were not borders at all. "Here is the border of Europe," says Colonel Krizsan, media spokesman of the border protection service, and, in a dramatic gesture, traces with his forefinger the red line that separates Hungary from the former Yugoslavia, Romania, and Ukraine on the map.

The fact is that the paths of the migration of nations to the West (to Sweden and Germany, above all) from the southeast lead essentially through Hungary. The war in the former Yugoslavia has shifted the traditional routes to the north, and the change of German asylum laws makes it appear advisable to go to Germany across the green border. Austria has increased the security of its borders. So now the traffic goes across the green borders of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, or in another direction through Slovenia and Italy. Hungary, a country with many neighboring states, offers itself geographically as an ideal corridor.

This is also known by the smuggling gangs who in the meantime have become East European-international in composition and, in addition to the business in human misery, also pursue such lucrative activities as trafficking in drugs and arms, as well as car smuggling. They work professionally, confirms Border Guard Lieutenant Colonel Szoeke, the director of the department for smuggling of human beings. One should merely imagine, he said, the organizational achievement embodied in a plan, which determines the interrupted path from a Chinese or Turkish province through five or six countries all the way to Germany. For the first time, the border guard smirks, the extinct CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] functions smoothly. The departure points for those who want to go to the West, as a rule, he says, are Moscow, Kiev, or Bucharest, since the former Soviet Union and Romania, thanks to the socialist foreign policy of the former years, let most of the Third World citizens enter without a visa.

The smugglers pick up their clientele at Vnukovo or Otopen airports and take them to cities close to the border, such as Arad or Temesvar. There they are taken over by natives acquainted with the locality and led across the green border to Hungary. Another "collaborator" of the smuggling organization, who has valid travel documents, drives a car or, still better, a bus quite legally across the border and then collects the refugees on Hungarian territory in small groups along the country road. The same process is used when passing into the Czech Republic or into Slovakia. The border protection service must have a great deal of luck or good informants if it wants to track down such a group. It is equally difficult to find people among peanuts, fruit and vegetables, or in furniture in trucks that are apparently properly sealed. In Hungary, Budapest is the take-off point of most of the migrants. At the eastern railway station the Arabian traders offer original Hungarian travel documents for as little as 10,000 forints (approximately DM170).

Hungary is squeezed as in a vice: As soon as the Western countries find out that the immigrants came through Hungary, they send them back at once. At the same time, the migration pressure from the east is growing. The estimates of the stream of immigrants to be expected vary, but it is presumed that, around Moscow, Kiev, and Bucharest each, several tens of thousands of people are waiting for smugglers. Among those waiting there are hardly any natives; for the most part they are people from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, or Vietnam. In 1993 more than 27,000 border violations and illegal border crossings became known to the Hungarian border protection service, and within two years more than a million people were turned back at the borders. The illegal border crossings are on the increase: For this year an increase of about 30 percent is expected. Not only is there an increase in the number of border violations that have become known, but also in their danger: The share of punishable offenses has increased. How many punishable offenses or trespasses have remained undiscovered no one dares to estimate.

The foreigners traversing Hungary increasingly destabilize Hungarian society. The incidence of crimes in the southeastern border regions—caused by the war in the former Yugoslavia—has assumed disturbing dimensions. Increasingly one can hear the view that Hungary,

at high costs and the use of immense human resources, must solve problems with whose origin it has nothing to do. The border protection service has been modernized; instead of persons liable for military service, attempts are being made to employ civil servants. Beginning in 1995, it is planned to do completely without persons liable for military service. Assistance with the training and information exchange came from the target countries, which are being shielded by Hungary. A modern computer network was developed with American assistance; from Germany came, above all, professional and moral support. Material assistance, on the other hand, remains limited. But how should a border protection service function which does not even have at its disposal mobile telephones in sufficient number and quality?

A further difficulty is the administration of justice of the Hungarian courts. Smugglers who have been caught, even if they are not in court for the first time, can count on light sentences. As a rule, they are warned and deported. The social danger of smuggling human beings is for the most part rated low by the courts, although the consequences, for Hungary, too, are incalculable. So it can happen that the smugglers get away with lesser penalties and fines than their victims. Bad prospects for the future—if the expectations of the border guards should come true.

Olechowski Interviewed on EU, NATO

BR1406121594 Paris LE FIGARO in French 14 Jun 94 p 5

[Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski by Charles Lambroschini in Paris; date not given: "For Poland, Europe Is the Best Guarantee of Security"]

[Text] [Lambroschini] Poland wants to become a member of the European Union [EU]. What is your main motive: trade or security?

[Olechowski] Staying outside the EU today means being condemned to economic isolation and being sidelined politically. There is another very important reason for our candidacy: We want to take as our model the process of reconciliation between France and Germany. With that in mind, there is no better framework than the EU. Poland and Germany have become very good and very strong neighbors. Our current relations with Germany are better than they have been at any time in our history. But to move from this situation of good-neighborly relations to friendship, we need a framework that goes beyond that of our bilateral relations.

[Lambroschini] Since German unification, some French politicians have been worried by Germany's growing power. Do you share that anxiety?

[Olechowski] I have noticed Germany's growing power. But, in my view, it will not be a danger as long as Germany remains a democratic country, and we have no reason to doubt that. And as long as Germany remains a member of the EU. In our view, the bloc formed by Germany and France is an extremely important factor. Now, let us take the speculation a little further and imagine that Germany wished to increase its independence. If we then started to think that this development was likely to have bad consequences both for the EU and for the Franco-German strategic alliance, the creation of a triangle with Poland could have a beneficial effect. Poland's involvement with the Franco-German duo would make it possible to counterbalance Germany's growing power and to make the EU stronger.

[Lambroschini] Is the power of Russia, your other big neighbor, not also a reason for your interest in the EU? Are you not worried by the idea that Russia, with which your relations have often been difficult, could return to its imperialist tradition?

[Olechowski] On the subject of Russia, a Polish foreign minister must necessarily be optimistic. Otherwise, he would be doomed to paralysis. Poland must participate in the construction of a Europe which absolutely must include Russia. We must insist on Russia becoming an integral part of the Western world: with its value system and its habits of behavior. If we had to resign ourselves to the fact that Russia could never become part of the West because it is anxious to recreate its own world, or conversely because the West rejects it, a Polish foreign minister would face only the sorriest of options. Like Moses, he would have to lead his people far away, because Central Europe would then be a very dangerous place. We want to join the EU for reasons of security, not simply economic reasons. However, we are convinced that Poland's security will never be guaranteed if it has to remain a front line country.

[Lambroschini] Do you not see the development in Russia of a nationalism which would compensate for poverty and humiliation?

[Olechowski] These periodic surges in nationalist and imperialist fever surely represent the biggest danger in Eastern Europe. But I also note that the political movements which defend these ideas did not succeed in securing a majority in the Russian elections. Today, there are two major currents running through Russia. The privatization of the economy enables the people to have a better understanding of the notion of private ownership. Therefore the demarcation line—which has traditionally been blurred in Russia—between reason of state and individual interest is being more clearly defined. The second current is Moscow's tendency to want to reintegrate the republics of the former USSR in one entity. But, for instance, on the occasion of the negotiations between Moscow and Belarus, we see that the Russians are now aware of the price to be paid for this integration. They realize that they would have to take bread from Russian citizens and give it to the poorest republics. This twofold development makes me optimistic about Russia's future.

[Lambroschini] Can Poland therefore make a contribution to Russia's European education?

[Olechowski] There is no question of Poland serving as a bridge between East and West or between the EU and Russia. None of those involved needs our country to play that role. Instead, Poland should serve as an example. Showing the Russians that, if we were capable of adapting to the West's values and principles, Russia can too. There is nothing genetic separating the Russians from the other Europeans.

[Lambroschini] In June 1991, Francois Mitterrand, defending in Prague a plan for a European Confederation, stated that the new democracies of Central Europe would have to wait decades before being able to rejoin the European Community. With Edouard Balladur as prime minister and Alain Juppe as foreign minister, do you think that France has changed its view?

[Olechowski] I hope so. June 1991 was well before Poland had demonstrated, in the 1993 elections, that its democratic institutions were strong enough to enable political alternation. It was well before our GDP had experienced an annual growth of 4.5 percent, well before we could show a private sector which now represents 60 percent of employment and totals 2 million enterprises.

[Lambroschini] But Francois Mitterrand's remark was also explained by the fear that too rapid an integration of the Central European countries might condemn them to economic bankruptcy.

[Olechowski] There is certainly an enormous economic difference between Germany and Poland. There is the same difference between Germany and Greece. But there is not such a great difference between Poland and Greece or between Poland and Portugal. In other words, we are as ready for membership as Greece and Portugal were when they were accepted into the European Community. The second observation was that in the foreign policy sphere, nothing would prevent Poland's immediate membership. The time has come for the EU to consider Poland's rapid integration in some spheres and to give it periods of adjustment or exemptions in other spheres.

[Lambroschini] Does Poland still want to join NATO?

[Olechowski] We want to join NATO and we say so frequently. We think that membership in NATO would be another means by which Poland could build a united Europe. NATO ought to be understood as the heart of European security, and this system of security ought to be open to all countries which correspond to the criteria of democracy.

[Lambroschini] If NATO is to be the means of European security, are you in favor of its expansion to include Russia?

[Olechowski] We think that Russia ought to form part of the European security system. What we advocate is a strategic partnership between Russia and NATO.

[Lambroschini] Does the fact that Europe has demonstrated such impotence in face of the conflict in Yugoslavia not leave you skeptical about the security guarantees which you could secure from the EU?

[Olechowski] That is why we are not talking of guarantees. We do not like this word, because Poland had all kinds of guarantees before the war and that served no purpose. We are arguing for the European countries to work together in the security sphere.

[Lambroschini] You therefore think that, in Yugoslavia's case, it would have been easier to prevent the war than to stop it once it had started?

[Olechowski] Well, I would answer you in this way: If Yugoslavia had been a NATO member, there would have been no conflict.

[Lambroschini] Do you agree with the Balladur plan for stability in Europe, which stipulates as a precondition for entry into the EU, that the Central European candidates should first settle their minority and border problems?

[Olechowski] Our region certainly needs the Balladur plan. But we do not like the idea that its implementation could be a precondition for Poland's entry into the EU. We have made great efforts. We have signed treaties of good neighborly relations with our seven neighbors. This shows our desire for compromise. But if this desire was lacking in one or two of our neighbors, I do not see why Poland's entry into the EU should be called into question.

[Lambroschini] Now that the former Communists have returned to power in Warsaw, what guarantees can you give the EU that they will remain faithful to democracy and to the market economy?

[Olechowski] There are no guarantees, there are only facts. For the eight months since the Social Democrats joined the government coalition, the observation has been clear. The market economy has been maintained and there is no sign of the government considering a return to a centralized system. Privatization is continuing—one could even say: as badly as under the previous governments—and I hope that it will be speeded up between now and the fall with a massive new privatization program. Finally, there has been no attack on democratic principles.

[Lambroschini] Has Western Europe, which for so long encouraged you to break with Communism, not disappointed you by the timidity of its support since the fall of the Berlin Wall?

[Olechowski] We have not been disappointed in monetary terms. The West's aid has been generous. Especially with regard to Poland, which has benefited from a large amount of direct aid and a reduction in its debt. We are very grateful for that. But what has disappointed us is the inertia and conservatism of the Western institutions. We are worried by the West's lack of vision.

Russia's Shumeyko Comments on Relations

LD1406200494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1719 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Warsaw, 14 Jun—Russian Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko told journalists after his meeting today with Senate Speaker Adam Struzik: "We have common views on almost all issues." He did not explain what "almost" meant.

He also avoided replying to questions on when Russia will join the Partnership for Peace and why President Yeltsin decided not to participate in festivities marking the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising. He expressed the view that the development of Polish-Russian economic relations depends, above all, on creating a legislative basis naturally conducive to direct cooperation between companies of both countries. "Political resolve will then no longer matter," he said.

Adam Struzik said the talks focused on general issues and also on concrete matters such as a future meeting of parliamentarians of the Kaliningrad oblast and Polish border regions.

Government Approves Budget, 'Open Sky' Pact

WS1506100194 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 Jun 94 p 9

[Report by MM: "Government; Poland Under 'Open Sky'; Budget Revenue and Expenditures Line Up Very Nicely"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers yesterday approved a report by the Finance Ministry concerning the implementation of the budget for January to May 1994, and it also approved a draft law to ratify the "Open Sky" treaty.

The report on budget implementation presented by the Finance Ministry states that after five months, 38.3 percent of planned revenue expenditures has been implemented, which is more than last year (37.5 percent). Budget expenditures are also higher than last year—36.2 and 35.6 percent, respectively. The ministry reports that there were no problems in financing the budget deficit.

The "Open Sky" treaty was signed by the foreign ministers of 25 countries as early as March 1992. It pertains to the issue of permission for mutual observation of terrain by aircraft of countries which are parties to the treaty. The convention will take effect after it is ratified by 20 countries. Up to now, only 16 countries have done so. At the beginning of each year, countries which want to conduct aerial observations, present the numbers of their planned flights. Countries over which the observations will be conducted (these are military and economic observations), will be notified 24 hours before the set date. The authorities of the countries, however, will not know the exact route of the flight until the very last moment.

Steel Workers Stage Demonstration in Warsaw

LD1406130194 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1000 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[Text] The workers on strike from the Warsaw Luchini Steelworks are staging a demonstration in front of the Council of Ministers' building. The demonstrators intend to hand in a petition demanding implementation by the government of the undertakings included in the agreement on the take-over of the Warsaw Steelworks by the Luchini Italian industrial group. Jan Szul is in front of the Council of Ministers building:

[Szul] About 3,000 steel workers are taking part in the demonstration. They have marched 10 km from the steelworks gate to the Council of Ministers building. Apart from the fact that they want to hand in a petition to a government representative, the steel workers also want to point out the fact that in the process of negotiating the agreement by the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Ownership Transformations employee interests have not been taken into account. Trade unionists are prevented from taking part in such negotiations. They usually learn what the agreement entails when it becomes a fait accompli.

The government claims that it should not be the addressee of the steel workers' demands. It believes that they should approach the steelworks board, because the steelworks is a private company now. The Italians own 51 percent of the shares. The steelworks board, however, claims that it is unable to meet the workers' pay demands because this would undermine the plant's financial situation. It does not want to launch any large investment projects either because, according to the board, the legal position involving the ownership of the land where the steelworks is located has not been properly sorted out.

At this time the demonstration is ending. In a few minutes the steel workers will set off on their way back to the plant.

Solidarity Commission Criticizes Walesa

WS1506115294 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Jun 94 p 2

[Report by Piotr Adamowicz: "'S' Appeals to Lech Walesa"]

[Text] The Presidium of the National Commission [KK] of "Solidarity" ["S"], which held a session on 14 June in Gdansk, appealed to Lech Walesa not to sign the new law on neopopiwek [the enterprise tax on above-normative pay]. Discussed was also the behavior of "S" Parliamentary Club Head Zbigniew Romaszewski, who supported the competition's candidate in supplementary elections to the Senate.

The unionists believe that the president should officially ask the Constitutional Tribunal whether the neopopiwek law is in accordance with the Constitution. They recall that "S" demands that the administrative control of wages be abandoned. Wages should be regulated through collective agreements; we are worried by the president's statements; he says that he is prepared to sign the neopopiwek law, due to the strikes and wage demands. The economic results of the last two months prove that despite the fact that there was no neopopiwek, inflation did not increase, said "S" Spokesman Piotr Zak.

"S," which did not submit its own lists of candidates, appealed to its members to take part in the 19 June self-government elections. "Unionists should back their colleagues or lists of oppositional groupings," Zak explained.

It was recalled that the only "S" candidate in the supplementary elections to the Senate in the Elblag Voivodship is Waclaw Bielecki. The teacher from Sztum was also supported by seven opposition parties, from the Union of Freedom to the Center Accord and the Movement for the Republic. In the meantime, Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski, head of the "S" Parliamentary Club,

became involved in the election campaign of a competitor—Edmund Krasowski of Gdansk, who currently does not belong to any party. Romaszewski's behavior encountered protests from almost 30 plant commissions.

"I would like to recall that the National Commission fielded Waclaw Bielecki. The involvement of an "S" senator in the campaign of another candidate is a violation of the union's procedures." Romaszewski was reprimanded by KK Deputy Chairman Leszek Szwec last week. Although he was asked to withdraw his support, Romaszewski took part in the campaign of a competitor. The unionists criticized the Sejm for amending the law on the protection of conceived life.

Reaction to 'Strategy for Poland' Program

Business Representatives Comment

WS1406131994 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 14 Jun 94 p 3

[Report by S.A., J.S.: "Businessmen and Experts on 'Strategy for Poland'; Not at Any Cost"]

[Text] *So far, privatization has brought uncertainty to mind. In order to gain social approval for ownership transformations, privatization must be done with society in mind. So "Strategy for Poland" also envisages the establishment of social protection for the workforce of those enterprises being sold to foreign investors,* said Professor Jan Monkiewicz, a secretary of state in the Office of the Council of Ministers, and an associate of Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko. According to a statement issued at a press conference, the Polish Business Council [PRB] has received with satisfaction the governmental Strategy for Poland program. Its provisions are largely in agreement with the views of PRB which has demanded such a document for two years now.

One cannot strive at privatization at any cost, by applying the principle of the state getting rid of a burden. Investors must have the financial means for investment and development. In addition, Jan Monkiewicz added, *we want to maintain the workforces' influence over the fate of the companies where they work.*

Placing the private and state-owned sectors on an equal footing in terms of their rights is an equally important issue relative to the functioning of enterprises. This is to facilitate transforming state-owned enterprises into companies based on Commercial Law. The transformation will have yet another dimension, as well: At the point that Commercial Law companies are established, employee boards will disappear since the Code of Commerce does not provide for such boards in enterprises. *So there will be a clear division of authority between trade unions, and the companies' governing boards,* J.Monkiewicz explained.

When asked how fighting inflation will be reconciled with fighting unemployment, Dr. Jerzy Hausner replied that according to the Strategy, the inflation level will be decreasing faster than the unemployment rate. The program envisages that unemployment will continue to rise both this year and next. According to J. Monkiewicz, high employment would not increase inflation, providing the work week is cut short and salaries are reduced in accordance with the work done. *Such methods have been applied in Germany among others. But for that, one needs first of all social consent,* said Professor J. Monkiewicz.

The lifting of popiwek [enterprise tax on above-normative pay] is to serve the goal of changing the situation of enterprises. In the view of experts, popiwek does not guard against anything but only serves as a bargaining chip. Salary negotiations should be conducted at the level of individual enterprises while the state may just be an umpire. *Some method of salary regulation is applied everywhere,* said Professor Danuta Hibner. *In Poland, one receives a penalty for raising salaries. The new element will be the possibility of awarding enterprises for observing rules, instead of applying punishment.*

The establishment of a Treasury Ministry has already been decided. It will take over ownership supervision over state-owned enterprises. *Work on a new law on the State Treasury is taking place in several different places. The discussions are about the functions and powers of the future Treasury Ministry,* Professor J. Monkiewicz stated. *We still do not know at this stage when the law will become effective.*

PRB has noted with satisfaction the governmental Strategy for Poland program. Its basic assumptions are largely in agreement with the views of PRB which has demanded such a document for two years now.

In our view, the Strategy identifies the problems that our economy is facing very well, both in the microscale and the macroscale. When we hear views that the program is unrealistic, we disagree. The problem is whether we know how to consolidate all the means in order to implement the program, said PRB Chairman Jan Wejchert.

According to PRB, the program's success will depend on the speedy implementation of the detailed provisions that will enable a speeding up of the rate of privatization, and the development of the capital market. The program's success will also depend on making bold changes in the tax system which would render the system clearly investment-oriented and exports-oriented. There must be a system of installment-based privatization procedure, a consolidated balance of payments for holdings, and a Guarantee Privatization and Development Fund. PRB is also preparing a proposal to introduce a system of breaks using investments as their legal basis; it would also include establishing new jobs and exports measures. According to PRB, implementing the measures being proposed by it, along with other measures mentioned in the Strategy, would result in establishing over 500,000 new jobs over four years. *Maintaining existing jobs is as*

important as the establishment of new ones. The constantly changing legal provisions concerning taxes and customs, are a reason behind the fall in the number of jobs, says PRB Deputy Chairman Zbigniew Niemczycki.

In his view, Poland still does not have the kind of investment dynamism that businessmen would like to see. Capital is being invested only in those places where there is a motivation for doing so.

Implications for MON, MSW

WS1406130994 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 14 Jun 94 pp 1, 2

[Article by Ryszard Choroszy: "'Strategy for Poland'; One Move Forward"]

[Excerpt] According to Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, over the next three years there will be more money for public security or for the national defense than there is now. How much? It will be decided by the parliament.

The author of the "Strategy for Poland" does not conceal that the expectations of the "uniform" ministries should be realistic. The plans for the socioeconomic policy until 1997 envisions an increase in the expenditures primarily in education, culture, and health protection. This year it takes approximately 11.4 percent of the GDP. If the expenditures in that sphere continue to increase, the "short blanket" will not satisfy the needs of other ministries.

Pressure on Expenditures

The deputy prime minister is not an advocate of defining permanent indexes of the share of the expenditures in the various areas of the state's total expenditures. The Ministry of National Defense [MON], however, expects that its budget will amount to at least 3 percent of the GDP. Only such expenditures make it possible to modernize the Army, which is a condition for adjusting the Army's structures, equipment, and armament to the requirements of the Western states. The sum in question is more than 10 trillion zlotys.

Similar expectations are held by the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. Not long ago Minister Andrzej Milcznowski revealed that he would like substantive expenditures to be the same as personal expenditures (currently they constitute 35 percent of the MSW budget). At the same time, at a government session devoted to public security, he demanded raising the wages of the functionaries of special services to the level found in MON.

The government's stand is that the expenditures in MON and MSW will increase at a rate close to the increase in the GDP. It plans that the GDP will be 22.5 percent higher in 1997 than it is now. Therefore, the expenditure on MON and MSW should increase 5 percent faster than inflation.

Will that really happen? It seems difficult to accomplish, if for only one reason: the "Strategy for Poland" also envisions the gradual limiting of the budget deficit to 2 percent of the GDP. Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko told POLSKA ZBROJNA that the balancing of public expenditures calls for discipline and "thrift spending of resources" that the ministries have. However, the ministers demand an increase in expenditures, which can be seen at every session of the government. [passage omitted]

PL-93 Backs Initiative To Suspend Iliescu

AU1406115094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] The Liberal Party-1993 [PL-93] seconds the initiative of its partners within the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] to initiate procedures to suspend President Ion Iliescu, says a political statement signed by the PL-93 Steering Committee, which was presented during today's news conference by Professor Balaceanu-Stolnici, chairman of the PL-93 Senate.

After emphasizing that the president and the government are conducting an antinational policy, the statement points out that PL-93 considers it mandatory that the procedures to suspend the president should be accompanied by a censure motion to withdraw the confidence granted to the Vacaroiu government.

Talking about other issues, PL-93 Senator Alexandru Popovici referred to the issue of nationalized dwellings, assessing that the way in which that subject has been approached could make one conclude that what they want is a definite nationalization.

During the news conference they also announced that PL-93 will request that the agenda of the next meeting of the CDR Standing Bureau should also include the issue of withdrawing the political support granted to Crin Halaicu, general mayor of Bucharest, who is guilty of having violated the law, as Ludovic Orban [member of the PL-93 Steering Committee] put it.

Opposition Invites Iliescu To Explain Actions

AU1406162194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Representatives of the parliamentary parties of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and the Democratic Party [PD] held a meeting at the Nastase Club this morning. Following the meeting they issued a communique which says that the signatory parties—the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party], the PAC [Civic Alliance Party], the PSDR [Romanian Socialist Democratic Party], the PER [Romanian Ecology Party], the PL-93 [Liberal Party-1993], the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], and the PD—representing the entire opposition in parliament, after having discussed the current political situation, including certain statements and actions by Romanian President Ion Iliescu that are unworthy of his presidential office and contradict the spirit of Constitution, have agreed to invite President Ion Iliescu to give the necessary explanations in front of a joint session of the chambers of Parliament before the end of the current session.

The communique also says that, depending on the president's answer to the invitation, the signatory parties reserve their right to further act according to stipulations of the Constitution. The communique also says that the signatory parties reached agreement regarding certain joint political actions they will carry out over the coming period of time.

Presidency Rejects Opposition Communique

AU1506110694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 15 Jun 94

[Text] A press communique sent to us last night by the Presidency spokesman states that Romania's president, acknowledging the communique issued by the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and the Democratic Party [PD], rejects—because there is no basis for them—the assertions that the head of state's actions and statements are unworthy of the presidential office and contradict the spirit of the Constitution.

After describing as surprising the frivolity with which representatives of certain parliamentary parties made such assertions, which are, quote, offensive to the head of the state as they lack any real foundation, unquote, the communique argues—using as evidence the transcription of the magnetic tape recording of Ion Iliescu's statements during his visit to Satu Mare in connection with nationalized housing—that every time Romania's president expressed his stance, he actually never did anything but insist that the Constitution and laws of the country need to be observed in such a controversial issue. Besides, the aforementioned stances were expressed because of the citizens' numerous grievances and complaints. They had been cruelly dislodged from their residences on the basis of court rulings, ignoring the law that stipulates that currently valid rental contracts are automatically prolonged for the next five years, until the legal status of nationalized housing is regulated by law.

As a consequence of all this, states the presidential spokesman's communique, there is nothing the president can retract from the things he said during the meeting in the Satu Mare County Prefect's office, in reply to a question he had been asked. The communique concludes by saying that, quote, if that answer, its context, and spirit are examined honestly, it becomes obvious that those things asserted by the president fully comply with the Constitution and with his resonsibilities as guarantor of the observance of the Constitution's stipulations, unquote.

Trade Unions Demonstrate in Bucharest

AU1406112194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Groups of protesters, members of the Alfa Cartel Trade Union Confederation, CNSLR [National Confederation of Free Unions in Romania]-Fratia, and the National Trade Union Bloc [BNS], began gathering in Aviatorilor Square in Bucharest this morning . Among the protesters our correspondents also spotted a group of

miners who had come from Hunedoara. Also represented are the trade unions of Copsa Mica and others from the counties of Mehedinti, Galati, and other regions.

From the makeshift rostrum in Aviatorilor Square the crowd was addressed by Alfa Cartel Chairman Bogdan Hossu, CNSLR-Fratia Chairman Victor Ciorbea, [CNSLR-Fratia] Executive Chairman Miron Mitrea, and other trade union leaders. They all criticized the Vacaroiu government, considering it solely responsible for the economic and social disaster currently facing Romania's citizens.

At about 1200 the participants in the rally left Aviatorilor Square to march on the Victoriei Square-Romana Square-Revolutiei Square route. They are to return to Victoriei Square where—in accordance with the alterations in the program arranged by the organizers of today's protests—another rally is to take place.

Both during the rally held in Aviatorilor Square and the march, the participants chanted antigovernment, antipresidential, and anticommunist slogans, our correspondents report.

Alfa Cartel Protests 'Intimidation'

AU1406200794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] On behalf of the organization committee of the Alfa Cartel National Trade Union Confederation, this evening we received the following communique:

On the pretext of the uncertain nature of the dialogue, considering that the government team is including fewer people than the trade union team, the executive rejects a meeting with the trade union members who have been designated by the assembly of representatives who are holding a rally in Victoria Square.

The representatives of the government want the number of trade union members who are included in the team not to exceed 15 people, while the trade unions wish to participate in the dialogue with a team that includes 40 people.

A psychological war has started in front of the government headquarters. The first demand voiced at Victoria Palace [government headquarters] is that the outside yard in front of the government building should be cleared, or the government will be compelled to resort to shield bearers. We protest such methods of intimidation, the more so since the bilateral dialogue has not even started yet, the communique we received from the organization committee of the Alfa Cartel National Trade Union Confederation says.

Government Issues Communique

AU1406202694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] A few minutes ago we received the following communique from the Romanian Government:

In connection with the Alfa Cartel Trade Union Confederation rally that took place in front of Victoria Palace today, the government spokesman is empowered to state the following:

Although negotiations with government were not included in the program of trade union demonstrations, nevertheless the government showed from the very first moment its willingness to hold a dialogue and, together with a trade union delegation, to look at all the claims brought up by demonstrators. It was established that the team of negotiators should include State Ministers Mircea Dan Popescu and Florin Georgescu, Government General Secretary Viorel Hrebenciuc, and Octavian Partenie, state secretary and government representative for relations with employers associations and trade unions.

It was also decided that discussions should take place in the presence of mass media representatives. Unfortunately, the government offer was not honored because the demonstrators did not display the same willingness as the government in establishing a reasonable number of trade union leaders to form their group of negotiators. At the time of this broadcast, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, together with Mircea Dan Popescu, Florin Georgescu, Viorel Hrebenciuc, and Octavian Partenie, are holding talks with a trade union delegation that includes Bogdan Hosu, Victor Ciorbea, and Florin Diaconescu and are trying to reach a solution regarding the number of members to be included in the trade union delegation.

The government proposal that the trade union group should include 15 people, considered to be sufficiently representative for the entire trade union spectrum participating in the demonstration, has been rejected by trade union leaders, who propose a delegation that includes no less than 40 people. However, the Romanian Government continues to maintain its willingness for a sincere and constructive dialogue with trade unions for a thorough examination of all real problems facing them, certainly in accordance with the real possibilities that the national economy can currently offer.

As a matter of fact, as is known, the claims of trade unions have been discussed on several occasions. Most of those claims are specific to a controlled, directed, and centralized economy that is no longer in line with the current stage in Romania's development, the communique sent to us by the spokesman of the Romanian Government reads in conclusion.

A few minutes before the start of our broadcast, our correspondent at the Government Headquarters informed us that the two sides have not reached a joint

accord on the major issue under discussion, namely the number of participants in the negotiations.

Tudor on Death of 'Adversary' Rabbi Rosen

94P20803A Bucharest ROMANIA MARE in Romanian 13 May 94 p 16

[Article by Corneliu Vadim Tudor: "On the Death of Moses Rosen"]

[Excerpts] Motto: "De mortuis nil nisi bene [bonum]" (Let nothing be said of the dead but good)—Chilo of Sparta.

I received the news of the passing into eternity of Rabbi Moses Rosen on Friday, at 1900. I was in Iasi, in a spring garden under a dried-out oak tree upon which some thoughtful farmer had placed a sign: "A tree which is well-cared for has 388 years of life". I did not see any signs of life but, nevertheless, no one dared to cut it down. [passage omitted]

Almost all the members of the leadership of the Greater Romania Party [PRM] were in Iasi—for a news conference. At dawn, after the plane landed, we went to the Church of the Three Hierarchs to lay a wreath with a tricolor ribbon at the tombs of the glorious voivodes Dimitrie Cantemir and Alexandru Ioan Cuza. Of course, Romanian Television did not show any part of it, not a word. Then, there was a dialogue with trade union leaders, which I could not attend since I had had only three hours of sleep in three days and three nights and I was exhausted. Professor Mircea Musat represented me. Finally, from 1430 to 1330, there was the much-awaited news conference before a packed hall. Many people said that it was a triumph for us, but the mouths of some impostors in the county press could not be shut up even by the earth from Eternity Cemetery. I hope that I can publish the entire discussion soon.

I do not know how it happened, but in the whirlpool of the dialogue with the press and the people in the hall, the name of Moses Rosen came up. Of course, at that time no one knew that he had died. To the surprise of many people, I was very restrained. Indeed, I even praised him for his participation, during very frosty weather, in the Alba Iulia festivities on 1 December 1993. "Do you want Vadim to say that I am not a good Romanian?"—the rabbi responded to presidential counsellor Victor Opaschi, who asked why he, an 81-year old man, did not stay home, in a warm place, that day. And I said, in Iasi, that indeed. at least on that occasion, the rabbi was a good Romanian, humiliating our political opposition which had boycotted the National Day celebrating the 75th anniversary of the Great and Eternal Union.

The rabbi also went into the Orthodox Church (which he had never done before) and wore a tricolor rosette with the picture of Avram Iancu. At that time, I realized that we can never know the depths of the human soul. For the first time in my life, I had fond feelings for that old man who had traveled over snow-covered mountains, while those who claim to be "national", "Christian", and "democratic" and who live off the corpse of the great Iuliu Maniu insulted the National Day. I said this to President Ion Iliescu. Then I spoke, publicly, at a PRM press conference on that paradoxical December. A few weeks later, when I had collected two pages of material critical of the rabbi, I had a change of heart and I remembered the little man with the teary eyes and frosty beard, on the stage decorated with fir trees, and I did not publish any of it. Indeed, I even sent the galleys to Ion Iliescu (something I never do) and I wrote him a few words, saying that I could not see any merit in carrying a fight to the absurd, especially when the adversary is old, powerless, and sick.

"Moses Rosen is dead!" a friend announced to me that Friday, near Iasi. There were a number of guests, besides me, including Iasi professor Gheorghe Buzatu, who had just returned from Israel, as well as Professor Mircea Musat, our parliamentarians Iuliu Furo, Anghel Stanciu, Ion Marinescu, Ion Carciumaru, Theodor Constantinescu, Viorel Burlacu, Marcel Moldovan, Dan Cristian Popovici, Generals Traian Bandila and Theodor Paraschiv, and other members of the PRM leadership such as Mircea Hamza, Dan Mirescu, Cornel Ciontu, Sever Mesca, and Alexandru Mica. The news passed quickly through the small garden where we were eating, from parliamentarians to newsmen, from newsmen to the leaders of the local prefecture. Then, I experienced a strange feeling: Instead of rejoicing (as someone who said to me: "I have some good news for you!" would have thought)—I was sad. My greatest enemy had died and I was suffering as one would after the death of a friend. I still did not know the human soul. I read in history books that, after their enemies died, our great voivodes made merry and feasted and even gave donations to the church. Since I am not a voivode and since I am animated by somewhat more Christian charity, I cannot do this. With the death of Moses Rosen, 15 years of my life become more barren. He began to denounce me to the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party and in the world press in 1979.

In 1980, after the publication of the famous article entitled "Ideals" [Idealuri], he denounced me once again. I was visiting him, accompanied by a Jewish photo-reporter Armand Rosenthal (one of my colleagues at AGERPRES, a particularly fine man), and I tried to give him a dignified explanation. But the rabbi told the world press that I had become a fascist and he told me to leave. This was not true and I do not know what made him falsify the truth.

In September 1980, he made the biggest mistake of his life: He sent a terrible letter to the Romanian Academy demanding that Volume IX of the complete works of Mihai Eminescu be taken off the market, calling the National Poet a fascist, Iron Guard supporter, hooligan, fool, and pornographer. This was a bit too much, a bit above the level of tolerance of the Romanian people. Three people protested this move: Alexandru Oprea, Pompiliu Marcea, and myself. The first two died under

mysterious circumstances. One had a cardiac arrest while bathing (at 50 years of age!) and the other drowned, in broad daylight, in Lake Herestrau. I did not die because God loved me, even though the rabbi said to one of his fellow Jews, in reference to the rumor that I would be receiving a grant to go to Italy: "If Vadim goes abroad, he might find himself with a knife in his back!" I did not go. I stayed home to see how my book of verses, "Saturnalia" [Saturnalii], was taken out of bookstores and libraries, also by the rabbi.

From April to November 1984, I was banned from the press and the radio. I did not appear on television, which, at that time, was controlled by Jews, from April 1984 to September 1990. These were hellish times for me. I was dragged into lawsuits. I received death threats on the telephone. There was ferocious psychological pressure. I was pursued. Most of the people regarded me as if I had the plague. Elena Ceausescu decided that I should receive severe sanctions from the party, after a memorial session and after Emil Bobu, instigated by her, put me at wit's end! Isn't that right, Ion Traian Stefanescu and Constantin Radu? You were there. My beloved parents prayed daily for me. My mother wept and her health became frail. She took everything to heart. But the wounds began to heal. It was hard for me but I did not die of hunger.

In 1990, after these events, the rabbi defamed Eminescu once again, calling him a fascist and Iron Guard supporter, in an Iasi review. Then he criticized a number of Romanian writers, from Fanus Neagu and Al. Calinescu to Eugen Barbu and Cezar Ivanescu. This was too much. The man did not know any bounds. He was convulsed by the tremors of a strange malady; dismembering Romanian culture. In 1957 he had denounced Mihail Sadoveanu's novel "The Axe" [Baltagul], at all forums. Later on, he criticized Vasile Alecsandri and Octavian Goga, threatening that, if he is not satisfied, we would not receive most-favored-nation treatment from the Americans, which was an exaggeration on his part, since the United States also had very great strategic interests in the area.

But, in 1990, he was in for a definite reaction. Romanians could respond to him since the press was free. Immediately, he disseminated throughout the world press the scare that "there is the scent of a pogrom in Romania." No one believed him. His time had passed. What pogrom? Who has anything against the Jews? At about the same time, in front of Coral Temple in Bucharest, he installed a sort of monument on which it is written that Romania was, allegedly, one of the centers of the world Holocaust and that we killed 400,000 Jews by terrible tortures. These were all lies, but I think that they were not originated by him but by the leaders of world Zionism who would like to blame the Romanian people to demand $50 billion in damages, as a greedy person revealed, in Tel Aviv.

The same holds true for the whole saraband of lies about the army and Marshal Antonescu. The televised appearances of the rabbi were scandalous, especially the one at the beginning of 1994 when, for 30 minutes, in prime time, he levied unimaginable insults against the Romanian people. Intentionally, I did not publish anything on the part of ROMANIA MARE which would escalate a useless scandal. As you probably remember, I presented the opinions of some disgusted Romanians, which had been published in EVENIMENTUL ZILEI and ORA. Probably His Eminence, if he was still lucid at that time, was shaken by the lightning bolts and agitation of the people's rage. It exceeded all limits. Later, two patriotic historians, professors Gheorghe Buzatu and Florin Constantiniu, went to the television studio seeking the right to reply and to restore some of the sullied honor of the army and the Romanian people. They were not allowed to do so. The rabbi was stronger. He acted like a head of state.

However, there is someone even stronger: God, who cut short the thread of his life. Some say that the curses of the war invalids who were mutilated at the battlefront, while the Jews swept the snow on the streets and drank hot cinnamon wine, got to him; others say that the anathemas of the Orthodox priests got to him; finally, someone telephoned me to tell me that he took along with him another great man who had been defamed by the rabbi, Eugen Barbu [founder of ROMANIA MARE], both dying in the same intensive care room in the Elias Hospital. I will not make any statement on this. There is a fatality, a predestination which is beyond us.

This is not the time or the place to judge the sins which Moses Rosen committed against the Romanian people. Who knows, perhaps they can be compensated for by his very great service to his people Israel, helping about 400,000 Jews to leave Romania for the Promised Land, the land of their ancestors, which is quite admirable, and to his credit! As for me, I have the courage and honesty to forgive him for the days and nights of nightmares which he caused for my parents and me. To forgive and forget in the Christian way. This is the difference between Christianity and Zionism, which does not forgive, does not forget, and even invents, constantly, other plagues, other holocausts, and other hunters of men.

I prefer to remember the rabbi as I saw him, in the flesh, for the last time, on that unforgettable day of 1 December 1993. At that time, a large part of his sins was washed away. I recognize this but I would have every reason to ignore such a thing. I am not an anti-Semite. I cannot be inherently against any people. And I cannot persecute the people who wrote the Bible. This is why I was saddened in my soul at the death of this old man. Perhaps I was reliving the sorrow of King David who had fought with his unyielding son, Absalom. But, when he found out that soldiers had killed him in an olive grove, he, the King of the Psalms, cried his heart out and ripped up his clothes. What strange alchemy is in the Romanian soul!

As for the funeral ceremony, which was broadcast live on Radio Bucharest, for two hours on Sunday evening, I believe that this was too much and it exasperated many citizens. I am relaying only a few of the telephone messages which we received: "It's a wonder that Iliescu did not proclaim a national day of mourning!"; "Is it possible that Nicolae Ceausescu's gravedigger, the sinister Gelu Voican, was not there?"; "Rabbi Neuman of Timisoara screamed hysterically and insulted the Romanians; he claimed that Moses Rosen fought against the Communists but he forgot to say that Rosen was a close friend of Ana Pauker [former Foreign Minister, a Jew] and that he was a deputy in the Grand National Assembly for 40 years."; "A week ago, the great bishop of Tomis and the lower Danube, the 80-year old scholar Antim Nica, died but Iliescu did not go to his funeral and Radiotelevision reported 1,000 times less about the bishop than it did about the death of the rabbi"; "Where did the American rabbi get the term "great genius" for Moses Rosen?"; "The richest man in Romania has died. Who got his money?"; "Did you read ORA on Saturday? On page 1, Nicolae Cristache has given the amazing title: "An Outstanding Personality of the World Has Died," as if the rabbi from Moinesti were an "outstanding personality" like Jesus Christ. Moses, Alexander of Macedonia, Julius Caesar, Dante Alighieri, Shakespeare, Leonardo da Vinci, Napoleon Bonaparte, Beethoven, or Brancusi!"; "Moses Rosen died but we still have the new Israeli ambassador who recently insulted Eminescu, calling him anti-Semitic and slaughtered Marshal Antonescu, once again, calling him a war criminal, even though, when you were in Iasi, you called for his expulsion from the country"; "When will Iliescu get out of the clutches of Eugen Preda-Glotter, director general of Radio? In the past four years, a number of great national cultural figures died, such as Edgar Papu, Ion Lancranjan, Eugen Barbu, Geo Bogza, Eugen Ionescu, Academician David Prodan, Petre Tutea, Father Dumitru Staniloae, Gina Patrichi, Gheorghe Cozorici, George Constantin, Theofil Valcu, Jean Georgescu, and Cella Delavrancea, and there was not a single minute of direct radio coverage of their funerals"; "Who is paying for the charter flight to Israel [where Rosen was buried]?"

We reproduced only a few of the indignant telephone calls from ordinary Romanians who could not understand how their Sunday and Monday evening radio programs could be replaced by the two live broadcasts, from Bucharest and Jerusalem. We reproduced these opinions because this is the democratic way. Radio subscriptions are paid for by Romanian contributors and they have the right to know what is being done with their money, their nerves, and their time. But, it is all over now. Let us accept the idea that it was a more special funeral of a more special clergyman, representing a special tribe of people. Let us not be evil and do what we criticize others for doing.

The rabbi desired my death but I did not desire his death. The rabbi made judgements about me but I did not make judgements about him. The rabbi banned me in my country but I did not ban him. I could not and I did not want to. After December 1989, the rabbi derided his great benefactor, Nicolae Ceausescu, which I did not do, although the former head of state punished me because of the rabbi. Also, Jews in Israel and the United States criticized Moses Rosen unsparingly for 40 years, but he did not accuse any of them of anti-Semitism.

"Moses Rosen is dead!"—the silent trumpet of that voice which gave me the news that the enemy of my home and of Romanian culture had crossed the threshhold to eternity still resounds. I was as sad as if my best friend had died. Undoubtedly, he was a person of international caliber, an educated man, a brilliant scholar of the Bible and the Torah, a character from a novel, a devoted husband, a distinguished pastor of Jewish souls. I think that all these qualities will carry a lot of weight at the Last Judgement. May God forgive him his sins, value his merits, and give rest to his tormented soul. Lord, have mercy on him! I forgave him long ago.

Croatian President Tudjman Visits

News Conference With Izetbegovic

AU1406155894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Report by Mladen Bosnjak on news conference by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, with unidentified correspondents in Sarajevo on 14 June; live, with portions recorded]

[Text] [Studio announcer] Some 10 minutes ago, Presidents of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina [as received] Alija Izetbegovic and Dr. Franjo Tudjman held a news conference at the end of Mr. Tudjman's visit to Sarajevo. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue with a tour of several places. We now go to our correspondent Mladen Bosnjak at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency [words indistinct]. Good day.

[Bosnjak] Good day. The news conference was very brief and actually consisted of two parts. In the first part, Mr. Kemal Muftic, adviser in the Presidency, read out the joint statement signed by both presidents, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic. Following this, Mr. Tudjman answered a mere one or two questions and that is how this meeting with the press corps ended. I suggest we listen to both; first the joint statement of the two presidents, and then the part, the two brief answers given in response to the correspondents' brief questions. Let us listen.

[Begin recording] [Muftic] Ladies and gentlemen, state delegations of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bosnia-Herzegovina [as heard], headed by Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman and President of the Presidency Alija Izetbegovic, [words indistinct] on 14 June, today in Sarajevo (?held) official talks on furthering relations and areas of possible cooperation between the two neighboring countries, particularly in the area of defense from the mutual aggressor, and several [words indistinct] issues pertaining to the economic, traffic, humanitarian [words indistinct] the process of establishing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and the establishment of the future confederation with the Republic of Croatia. The two presidents held long talks behind closed doors, and were later joined by the president and vice president of the Federation, Messrs. Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic. The official talks between the delegations were attended on the Croatian side by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dr. Mate Granic, Deputy Prime Minister Borislav Skegro, Defense Minister Gojko Susak, the president's National Security adviser, Hrvoje Sarinic, presidential advisers Ivic Pasalic and Slobodan Lang, and the Republic of Croatia's ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Zdravko Sancevic. For the host country, the delegation was comprised of Prime Minister Dr. Haris Silajdzic, Deputy Prime Minister Edib Bukvic, Defense Minister Hamdija Hadzihasanovic, Foreign Minister Dr. Irfan Ljubijankic, Minister for Industry Faruk Smajlbegovic, Minister for Refugees and Social Welfare Dr. Arif Smajkic, Justice Minister Dr. Kasim Trnka, and Information Minister Ivo Knezevic.

In the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding, and respect, and keeping in mind the wider international implications of the aggression on both countries, the two presidents expressed the belief that the mutual recognition of all the states created after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the international monitoring of Serbian and Montenegrin borders toward Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 787 and 838 [Muftic is interrupted by an unidentified voice that says 769] and 769, (?is) a necessary step for establishing lasting peace in this part of the republic. On this occasion, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia again confirmed their commitment to peace and a negotiated solution to all conflicts, but their highest representatives consider it necessary that the international community should provide clear guarantees for the cessation of the aggression and occupation, and the full observation of human rights and the territorial integrity of both countries in order to further the relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In this sense, they agreed that the following be accomplished through the work of joint commissions:

a) The liberalization of the transit of the citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the transit of goods through the Republic of Croatia, according to the laws of the Republic of Croatia.

b) Joint [words indistinct] the return of the refugees and displaced persons according to the principle of all to their homes.

c) The opening up of all communications and telecommunication links, particularly (?between) Split, Mostar, Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla.

The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina supports the Republic of Croatia in all its legitimate efforts and attempts aimed at a peaceful reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories into its state, legal, and economic system. The Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will jointly build two bridges on the Sarajevo-Ploce railroad. The money, project, and supervision will be provided by Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the work will be carried out by construction companies from Croatia. The stands on the use of the Ploce port have been agreed on in principle.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia will agree on the joint strategy of approach in the talks on the succession with the Islamic countries, especially Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

An agreement was also reached on the joint appearance in third countries through mixed commissions. In order to rationalize the diplomatic network, the embassies of Bosnia-Herzegovina in some countries will represent the interests of the Republic of Croatia and vice versa, where this is proves to be useful.

It was also agreed that the problems of the property of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia and vice verse be solved without delay, in accordance with the interstate agreement. The two presidents agreed that [words indistinct] the individuals who are against the spirit and practice of the established federation and the future confederation be removed.

The talks between the highest state delegations of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were held with the intention to remove all misunderstandings through the constant and direct cooperation of official representatives of the two countries.

Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, has invited Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to visit the Republic of Croatia. The invitations have been accepted with pleasure. The visits will be arranged through the usual diplomatic channels.

This was the joint statement by the two delegations (?led by) Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman.

[Izetbegovic] Ladies and gentlemen, we do not have much time considering that President Tudjman should (?travel further) and that we spent a bit more time on agreeing this statement. Before we start with questions and answers, I would particularly like to draw your attention to the part of this statement that represents the message of President Tudjman and me, a message that consists of two proposals, namely that of all states that emerged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia start recognizing one another. This is our first message. The second message is that the control of borders be secured, of course, [words indistinct] the Croatian-Serbian border, up in the north, then the Serbian-Bosnian border, and the Montenegrin-Bosnian border. This is what I particularly wanted to draw your attention to. This is our message to the world. The rest more or less concerns our [words indistinct]. This is all. We are ready to answer your questions. Of course, we will not spend (?much time).

[Tudjman] I would like to say that the Croatian delegation came to Sarajevo, and not only to Sarajevo as we are, our delegation will continue journey through Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to contribute to the realization of the Washington agreement on the creation of the Federation and confederation.

[Unidentified speaker] We have five minutes.

[Correspondent] (?I would like to ask) Mr. Tudjman. Does the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna exist?

[Tudjman] It exists. Since the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna was created during the resistance against Serbian aggression, it will exist until the Federation comes into life and until the foundations have been laid for the confederation.

[Correspondent] Mr. Tudjman. What is the first [word indistinct] Will you go to Kiseljak and (?on from there)?

[Tudjman] Leave that for subsequent reporting.

[Correspondent] Is there a chance of you visiting some other places, like Mostar [word indistinct] try to help the implementation of the [word indistinct] federation.

[Tudjman] Herceg-Bosna does not need to die, but it must be incorporated into the Federation as an essential basis for (?the Federation) and the confederation.

[Izetbegovic] The question that you asked has been regulated by the constitutional law very clearly, namely, that the existing authorities continue functioning until the federal authorities are set up. This is the so-called temporary arrangement and that is how it is regulated.

[Muftic] (?If there is nothing else) [words indistinct] Thank you for your time. [end recording]

[Studio announcer] We have our reporter Mladen Bosnjak with us. Therefore, Mladen, what else was included in the program of the visit by Dr. Tudjman?

[Bosnjak] As we have already reported, Croatian President Mr. Franjo Tudjman arrived at Sarajevo Airport at approximately 0930. At approximately 1000 he entered the Presidency building, where we was received by his hosts—Mr. Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Zubak, Vice President of the Federation Ejup Ganic, the Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister and several ministers in the government, and the Sarajevo mayor. After the ceremonial welcome, the official talks started, which resulted, as we have just heard, in an announcement, that is to say, a statement of the two (?presidents) and also this impromptu news conference.

To the surprise of, I would say, his security service, Mr. Tudjman decided to stroll through the streets of Sarajevo from [words indistinct] to the Embassy of the Republic of Croatia, which was ceremonially opened today. On that occasion he met with several Sarajevo residents. It seems to me that these contacts have surprised the Sarajevo residents themselves, however, a certain intimacy and happiness about these contacts could also be sensed, because this is also one of the signs that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, the federation of the Croats and the Muslims-Bosniaks, is springing into life.

After his stay in the embassy building, Mr. Tudjman [word indistinct] the Presidency building where Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic held a ceremonial lunch in his honor, and afterward they held the news conference—we have already heard the recording that we have broadcast unedited to be able to report promptly about the most important event in Bosnia-Herzegovina today.

That's it from the Presidency building about Mr. Tudjman's visit in Sarajevo.

Tudjman Opens Croatian Embassy

AU1406162094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] At the opening of the Croatian Embassy in Sarajevo, Dr. Franjo Tudjman said, among other things, that he was convinced that we were at the end of the tragedy that this town and the Muslim and Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have had to endure. We can be proud of the fact that the Croatian people have contributed greatly to the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [Words indistinct], he said, so that we can pick the fruit of the permanent unity between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

Today's official opening of the Croatian Embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sign that we are implementing resolutely the Washington agreement on the creation of the federation of the Bosniaks and the Croats and the confederation with Croatia, Dr. Tudjman said. He emphasized that this was a proof that, in search of friendship with the Bosniak-Muslim people, a certain level has been reached with the realization of the agreement on the federation and that the future confederation is paving the way to the end of the war, the aggression, and the tragedy of Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Tudjman Hails Bosnian Croats

LD1406220094 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Address by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to local Croats at Franciscan hospital in Nova Bila, central Bosnia, on 14 June—recorded]

[Text] On my visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo and other places, I could, naturally, not avoid visiting Nova Bila, that is, I had to visit Nova Bila first. Nova Bila is first because it has become a symbol of Croatian resistance, of the Croatian survival, of the determination on the part of the Croat people of the Lasva valley—as well as of the whole of the Croatian homeland, and not only Croats in the homeland, but also those in the diaspora—to survive here and everywhere else where Croats live.

Someone said that this used to be a marginal area. The entire Croatian nation used to be marginal. At that critical, historic moment of the disintegration of the Yugoslav dungeon and the socialist hell, no one wanted an independent, sovereign, and autonomous Croatian state. Consequently, the Croat identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself was in jeopardy.

Despite this, due to the unity of all Croats, we have managed to establish a democratic and sovereign Croatia because the Croats from Herceg-Bosna, from this Lasva valley, from all over Bosnia, fought first to establish and defend the Croatian republic, the Croatian state. This is why later we could offer assistance to you—humanitarian and other kinds of assistance—and prevent the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina from falling into the hands of greater Serbia. This is why we supported the creation of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, so we could take part, take decisive part in resolving the destiny of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is why we managed—to the surprise and awe of the world—to defend the Croatian state. There was even this miracle that took place here in Nova Bila where doctors, you, defended the Lasva valley from those who wanted to conquer the Croatian areas.

Consequently, the doctors performed miracles in God's temple by operating on even the most serious cases. Thanks to such miracles, relying only on our own strength and on our own wisdom, the world had to recognize us. Today, not only do we have an internationally recognized Croatia but we have allies and friends, too, including the United States, the world's biggest superpower, and all over the world, all the way up to China and Europe.

The Washington agreement on the Croat-Muslim federation and the confederation of this Bosnia-Herzegovina federation with Croatia has made it possible for you to no longer remain on the sidelines, so the Croat man here in Bosnia-Herzegovina no longer has to be oppressed and subjugated. He can be sovereign in this federation. By relying on Croatia, Bosnia can remain and become ever more Croatian. [applause]

Rest assured, what we have achieved is in the interest of all Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rest assured, this is in the interest of the Croatian state which will now survive. We have not allowed, we will never allow new Bleiburgs to take place [reference to massacre of Serbs and Croats by Tito's partisans in 1945]. Croatia is today a recognized country in the world and has powerful friends and allies. The sole problem rests with the fact that even here in Bosnia-Herzegovina we should get used to a situation in which Bosnia-Herzegovina is now a Croatian country, too, in which the Croatian man is entitled to sovereignty in it.

Consequently, we have secured the survival of the Croatian state. We have secured the survival of the Croatian sphere in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the sovereignty of the Croatian sphere in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are going to restore what has been destroyed. I promise, we are going to build a new modern hospital in Nova Bila in the interest of the Croat people because this area deserves it. Likewise, we are going to build schools and cultural and economic facilities in the interest of the

Croat man. No one is going to chase us away, all the way up to remote Canada, America and Australia, any longer. We are everywhere, from the South to the North Pole. We are going to turn our Croatia into a country to which people will return; they are already returning.

This has been accomplished by you, by us all. We can be proud of this miracle performed by the grace of God. Our fate here in Bosnia-Herzegovina is in our hands. Trust yourselves, trust the leadership that made this possible. Greetings.

Izetbegovic, de Mello, Rose Discuss Accords

AU1406183294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, received Sergio de Mello, chief of the civilian sector of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] for the former Yugoslavia, and General Michael Rose, commander of the UNPROFOR forces for Bosnia-Herzegovina, today. During the meeting they examined the implementation of the Geneva cease-fire agreement and the agreement on the exchange of prisoners, and the development of the situation in Gorazde.

We have concluded that the agreement of the countries is being observed, de Mello said for the B-H PRESS agency after the talks, even though there have been cases of cease-fire violations. We hope that in the course of the coming week a new meeting of the warring sides will take place in order to promote this agreement and prolong it by at least another month, he added.

Speaking about the meeting at Sarajevo Airport, where the fate of prisoners and the missing persons was discussed, de Mello expressed optimism, emphasizing that the two sides were interested in making progress in this sphere, too. Regarding Gorazde, it was agreed which steps must still be undertaken to allow the residents return to their homes in the areas [words indistinct] around the town.

Foreign Minister Views Situation, Peace Prospects

NC1406113694 Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-MASA'I in Arabic 11 Jun 94 p 2

[Interview with Bosnian Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic by Ashraf al-'Ishari; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Al-'Ishari] First, what about current developments in Bosnia in light of the international efforts to solve the crisis?

[Ljubijankic] The situation is getting worse every day. The Serbian forces have never respected their pledges, despite the international pressure on them. Acts of genocide are continuing intensively every day as well as the ethnic cleansing and the organized rape of Bosnian women in violation of all international norms and charters. The Serbs' siege of our people is continuing while the international community refuses to lift the arms embargo imposed on us so that we can defend ourselves.

There are still innumerable excesses despite the efforts of the UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo. The UN forces have not succeeded yet in stopping the bloody battles waged by the Serbs or the violations being perpetrated against us, especially the massacres and the killing and displacement of children, women, and old people.

[Al-'Ishari] Are you satisfied with the role and performance of the Islamic and Arab countries in support of the Bosnian people? What is your assessment of the role of the Egyptian forces in Sarajevo as part of the UN forces?

[Ljubijankic] Yes. We have been completely satisfied with the Islamic and Arab countries' role and their support and backing for our people and our cause from the first day that the battles and events erupted here. Some Islamic countries and organizations, led by the Islamic Conference Organization, have played a major role in supporting our cause and exposing the Serbs' crimes and violations before world public opinion. Moreover, some Islamic countries hastened to give material and humanitarian aid to our forces and people. Foremost among these countries is Egypt, whose forces are participating with the UN forces. As to the Egyptian forces' role in Sarajevo, it is much admired and appreciated by the Bosnian people, who are proud of having these troops among the UN forces. [passage omitted]

[Al-'Ishari] What are the reasons for your country's hesitant acceptance of the cease-fire agreements, particularly the recent ones, as demanded by the United Nations?

[Ljubijankic] We have never hesitated or rejected a UN demand for a cease-fire but have always had reservations about such demands. We feared that the Serbs would legitimize their occupation of territories in Bosnia and impose the fait accompli by force through our acceptance of the recently announced truce. We rejected this and conveyed our stand to the two international meditators and the UN envoy to Sarajevo. We frankly said that our acceptance of the European peace plan is contingent on confirmation of the return of all the Bosnian refugees who have fled from their cities and houses under the pressure of Serbian attacks. The refugees' return represents one of our most important conditions for accepting the peace plan. If the refugees return, then this would mean rejection of the seizure of the territories of others by force and recognition of the Bosnians' right to their territories and cities. The problem will be solved when this is done. [passage omitted]

[Al-'Ishari] Are you expecting to see peace established in Bosnia in 1994?

[Ljubijankic] [passage omitted] I personally do not expect to see the peace that we are seeking achieved in 1994 so quickly and for several reasons. There are so far

no clear bases or an influential power that can convince the Serbs to respond to the voice of reason and peace and sign the comprehensive peace agreement. We in Bosnia would be happy if the Serbs abandoned the notion of establishing their expansionist state by force or if a Serbian figure convinced of the need for a dialogue with the Bosnian leaders were to emerge. At the same time, we categorically reject any conditions imposed on us by force. Such a policy has proved to be a failure and will not bear fruit as some quarters believe. On the contrary, it will only stiffen our stand because right is on our side and we have not usurped the territories of others by force.

Sarajevo Radio: Serbian Army Shelled Funeral

AU1506090094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 15 Jun 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[Text] The fierce attacks by the united aggressors [Serbian army, western Bosnian leader Fikret Abdic's forces] have continued on the free Bihac region. Yesterday afternoon [Bosnian Serb leader Radovan] Karadzic's chetniks from their stronghold in Veliki Radic fired several howitzer shells at a funeral in Jezersko, and then continued shelling the other free parts of the Bosanska Krupa municipality. They have been shelling Buzim from the territory of the so-called Serbian autonomous region of Krajina, and all night and this morning they have been shelling the outskirts of Cazin, Krivaja, (Pljanici), [words indistinct], (Spahici), (Gornje Srbljane), and [word indistinct]. This is obvious proof of their collaboration with Abdic's traitorous phalanx, and yet another open aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina, as they skillfully use Abdic as a smokescreen for their attacks.

The Kladusa rebels and mercenaries have also continued with their bestial attacks along the entire front line. Their artillery and infantry attacks never ceased throughout the night, and have even intensified this morning.

Another appeal has been sent to the international organizations to try and save the families that are being prosecuted in Velika Kladusa.

'Fierce Clashes' Continue

LD1406150494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1345 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Excerpt] Petrovac, 14 Jun (TANJUG)—Inter-Muslim clashes in Cazin Krajina [western Bosnia] have resumed for the fourth day running, local Muslim media have reported. Radio Velkaton in Velika Kladusa reports that fierce clashes continued throughout the night on almost all parts of the front. The fiercest attacks by Izetbegovic's 5th Corps were registered in the Trzac, Pecigrad, Liskovac, and Todorovo areas. According to the same source, both sides suffered a large number of wounded, killed, captured, and missing soldiers.

Muslim Radio Bihac reports, and Radio Cazin and Muslim radio Sarajevo have confirmed, that Fikret Abdic's units launched fierce attacks over the past 24 hours, targeting Pecigrad and Todorovo with artillery weapons. Muslim Radio Bihac reports that Abdic's forces attacked a bus in the Cazin municipality and injured a number of passengers. Radio Bihac also reports that a large number of people have been injured, killed, or captured. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Serbs Report Continued Muslim Attacks

LD1406195294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1716 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Zvornik, June 14 (TANJUG)—Attacks on the Bosnian Serb republic (RS) are continuing since last Friday when a U.N.-brokered four-week ceasefire in Bosnia came into force. Bosnian Serb military sources told TANJUG on Tuesday that Moslem troops loyal to Alija Izetbegovic shelled Teslic (central Bosnia) injuring two civilians and causing considerable material damage.

The Moslems opened combined infantry and artillery fire on Bosnian Serb army positions southeast of Teslic. After the Bosnian Serb troops returned fire, the attacks stopped. In the region of Orasje (Bosanska Posavina), units of the local Bosnian Croat Defence Council (HVO) and troops of the regular Croatian Army carried out joint infantry and mortar attacks along the entire lines of separation with the Serbs. So far there are no reports about the effects of the Croat attacks, and Bosnian Serb military sources mention the destruction of civilian facilities.

Troops loyal to Izetbegovic continued provoking the Serbs in the region of Srbobran (formerly called Donji Vakuf), in central Bosnia, and in the area of Mts. Vlasic and Ozren. In the Bihac-Krupa front, in northwest Bosnia, the Moslems opened infantry fire. They also renewed attacks on the Kalinovik-Konjic fronts, northern Herzegovina.

According to the Bosnian Serb military sources, the Moslems also launched provocative actions from Gorazde, Moslem enclave in eastern Bosnia and a U.N. 'safe area.' In Sarajevo Izetbegovic's troops opened sporadic infantry fire on Serb positions in Liljas and Hadzici. Moslem snipers shot at the Serb suburbs of Grbavica and Lildza.

Serbs: Muslims 'Violated' Cease-Fire Agreement

LD1406220394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2022 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Doboj, June 14 (TANJUG)—Moslem formations on all fronts in the wider region of Doboj, northern Bosnia, violated the ceasefire agreement by bringing in reinforcements and opening strong small arms and artillery fire at Serb (?defence) positions and villages, the information service of the First Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army said on Tuesday evening [14 June].

The Moslems were especially aggressive on the eastern sector of the Teslic front, where they are threatening Serb positions by constant artillery barrage and small arms fire. Serb units are forced to return equally strong fire in order to protect their positions and defend their lives, the statement said.

Moslems also stepped up small arms and mortar attacks on the Doboj front, especially under cover of the night. After the Serb side returned fire, the Moslems stopped attacking. Strong movements by the Moslems' motorized vehicles have been registered on this front, around Doboj. The Moslems are believed to be bringing in reinforcements from Tesanj and amassing these troops near Serb defense positions southwest of Doboj.

Moslems also attacked Serb positions and villages with small arms fire on the northeastern slopes of Mt. Ozren in northern Bosnia, and on the left bank of the River Spreca. Serb units did not return fire.

RSK Minister: Galbraith Visit 'Dangerous'

AU1406204994 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jun 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Galbraith's Visit to RSK 'Extremely Dangerous'"]

[Text] Knin—Borivoj Rasuo, information minister in the government of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], yesterday sent a letter to RSK president Milan Martic in which he put forward his personal views regarding President Martic's demand that his ministry organizes a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith. In his letter, Minister Rasuo says:

"The meeting with the U.S. ambassador to Croatia on the RSK territory, in the circumstances in which the RSK finds itself—of which the most important one is that the RSK has not been internationally recognized yet—is extremely dangerous because the visit of Mr. Peter Galbraith to the RSK could be interpreted as extending Croatia's sovereignty over the territory of our state, which is in any case unacceptable. Furthermore, because Mr. Peter Galbraith is continuously putting forward a view that the RSK is an integral part of Croatia.

"For this reason, Mr. Martic, I will not be able to participate in any aspect or any form in the organization of a meeting with the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, a country with whom the state in whose government I am a minister is on hostile terms through no will and blame of its own.

"Second, for the duration of the unscrupulous media war that the Croatian journalists have been waging against the Serbian people as a whole and thus also against the Serbian people in Krajina—a media war that threatens to grow into a real armed aggression by Croatia against the Serbian Krajina, as the Croatian leaders are announcing—I believe that Croatian reporters must not be granted permission to enter our state territory. The Information Ministry will not issue them with press passes. Bearing in mind such a stance, it is thus understandable that there is no need for the organization of a reception for the Croatian reporters in the RSK.

"Beside this, I inform you, Mr. Martic, that I am not willing to share the responsibility for the decisions that I do not make and in the passing of which I make no contribution. On any other occasion, when my consent and consent of the government whose member I am will exist regarding decisions to be passed and whenever we agree something in advance without the need for persuasion, you can count on my assistance and cooperation."

Galbraith, Martic View Cease-Fire

LD1406214094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2037 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Knin, 14 Jun (TANJUG)—U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith visited Knin and the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] today where he held talks with RSK President Milan Martic and his associates, the ISKRA news agency has reported.

The basic topic of their talks was, as both Galbraith and Martic said at a news conference, the issue connected with the implementation of the Zagreb cease-fire agreement, i.e. the removal of the remaining misunderstandings between the Croatian and Krajina sides ahead of negotiations on economic issues and cooperation to be held this week. Galbraith and Martic assessed the talks as useful and stressed that they encompassed a wide spectrum of current issues and problems.

Galbraith particularly stressed that at the meeting today the Krajina side told him of their concern over Croatia's failure to comply with the cease-fire agreement and a reduced level of monitoring by military observers of the demilitarized zone on the Croatian side of the separation line. He said that he was taking these demands extremely seriously and that he would inform his government and the Croatian side about them.

President Martic particularly underlined Galbraith's stance that the Krajina-Croatia conflict could no longer be resolved by force. The war option accomplishes nothing, Martic stressed and added that today's talks focused specifically on the conduct of the Croatian and Serb police in the buffer zones. He also said that most misunderstandings have been removed as far as the Krajina side was concerned, while Ambassador Galbraith promised he would take similar steps to remove misunderstandings in Zagreb.

Asked by reporters which issues could be agreed on quickly at the upcoming negotiations, Martic replied: These issues concern the securing of water supplies for Zadar by us, in return for the delivery of spare parts for the Obrovac hydroelectric power plant and the securing of water supplies for Teslingrad and Drnis by the Croatian side.

We would then review humanitarian issues regarding compensation to hard currency account holders and pensioners—57,000 pensioners on the territory of the RSK. Only then will we discuss the opening of the Adriatic oil pipeline, on condition that it is completely opened all the way to Pancevo where Krajina crude oil is processed, Martic concluded. He added that communications issues could only be tackled after peace was stabilized and other issues are resolved.

Ambassador Galbraith will also be visiting the Benkovac area, especially the devastated Serb villages of Kasic and Islam Grcki, ISKRA reports.

Kukan's Visit, Relations With Slovenia Viewed

AU1506085094 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 9 Jun 94 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov-Colic: "In the Shadow of the Unpredictable Neighbor"]

[Text] What the proverbially calm, polite, and balanced Slovene president stated after the meeting with Franjo Tudjman could hardly be described as routine protocol ingratiation. "These were open, polemical, at times hard talks, but there can be no solution without dialogue," said Milan Kucan polemically, openly, and hard, but also with a sigh of relief because the two presidents did meet after 20 months; the malicious will establish that in this unsettled period Zagreb meanwhile had more meetings with Bucharest than with Slovenia, which is at its doorstep and its neck. In these belated discussions, Tudjman, as usual—regardless of the fact that it has only been several years—viewed the whole thing with the inevitable historical distance, while the Slovene president mostly spoke of the dark Balkan present and the uncertain European future. To what extent these things are out of joint in a completely unnatural way is best witnessed by Tudjman's choice of words, when, speaking of contentious interchanges, spoke out as if the nonaligned summit in Cairo were still on: "Neither Slovenia nor Croatia have any expansionist or imperialist demands in relation to each other."

In the international diplomatic vocabulary such terms ended up on the ideological trash-heap of the defeated state-ology long ago, but evidently the Croatian president feels great only when he uses great words that sound dark and dire. The uninformed would think that it was Rabin and 'Arafat who met, rather than the leaders of two states whom the world keeps reproaching for arguing like two sulky children competing in inventing evidence of greatness. During the time of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia seemed to many like Siamese twins that were about to start a happy family as soon as they ran away from the hateful Belgrade family, and then they started to look at each other across the Sutla River as if across the banks of the Jordan. In their renewed greed, some Italian politicians have proclaimed Slovenia a small provincial region, but Croatia also suffers such slander all the time, even when Istria is not at issue. The blindness of self-sufficient triumphalism can then perhaps be described no better than by Kucan's ineffective lamenting over the newly liberated and newly established states' childish habit of extolling themselves too much while speaking of everyone else in an unreasonable way.

The Slovene president did not say so publicly, but evidently the Slovenians justifiably feel nauseous when Tudjman talks about Croatia as the "super-state" with "super-democracy" and "super-economy" that all the countries of former communism can look up to, never—or only seldom—looking over his shoulder and into the neighbor's yard, in which fruit trees (the agreement with the European Union, the Partnership for Peace, the Council of Europe, the PHARE [Economic and Reconstruction Aid to Poland and Hungary] program), which he keeps specifically promising to Croatia, have already grown.

After the unwrapping of the "Croatian-Slovene package," which started after the first unfruitful visits of the "European threesomes," and became inevitable as soon as Slovenia got rid of foreign supervision and European observers, Ljubljana thought too soon that it had run away from the Balkans, while Croatia hoped too soon that it would replace Serbia as a new regional superpower, primarily in Bosnia-Herzegovina—regardless of the outlaws in its own backyard—and then as the fortress wall of something long gone by, such as the stories about "the bulwark of civilization" and "the dividing-line of the worlds." This language is still spoken, although there are few who believe in this kind of delirious dream, while in the meantime Slovenia has also realized that its TV's and water heaters do not fascinate European consumers just because it has decided to proclaim itself Europe and has preached everywhere that it has no ties with or obligations to "those Balkans."

Ljubljana and Zagreb kept arguing over a dry river bed until they realized—if they realized—that both live in the shadow of an unpredictable neighbor who, deep down, hopes that hundreds of kilometers on both sides of the disputed former river will again become his property. In that framework, some of Berlusconi's ministers inadvertently did a great favor both to Croatia and Slovenia, who were constantly looking too high and too far, over and above their heads, and which in many ways still come within the same mirror, as there can be no imperialism without an empire, and both Croatia and Slovenia occasionally suffer from the delusion that by contemplating their own navels they are contemplating the navel of the world.

Commentary Views Tudjman-Kucan Meeting

AU1506085394 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jun 94 p 3

[Commentary by Josip Antic: "Good Vibrations"]

[Text] Yes—no—yes! These binary oppositions with a happy ending are one of the shortest ways of describing the state-protocol battle of wits that the media promptly communicated to the people of both states before the unofficial visit of Milan Kucan, president of Slovenia, to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. In spite of the hesitations of the important Slovene guest, the visit did take place as planned. The Slovene side first did not understand the circumstances of the presidential invitation, and then—with the new summer wave of tightening the interstate ropes—whether 7 June was the most suitable time for a one-day trip to Zagreb. Namely, the short distance from the Slovene capital to the Croatian one is still inversely proportionate to the great quantity of the unresolved diplomatic luggage that the representatives of the two states take out at the joint table. This should not be surprising, since the Croatian and Slovene presidents last met some 20 months ago—although at that time they publicly stated the willingness to meet at least once a year to develop good neighborly relations.

At any rate, everything Franjo Tudjman took out of his suitcase at Brdo near Kranj in 1992 to show Milan

Kucan will now be presented by Kucan to his host in Zagreb in a somewhat different wrapping: the unresolved border issues, the untouched legal infrastructure regarding the property issues, the stagnation of the economic relations.... On the other hand, the unresolved regime in the bay of Piran, the arguments with which Croatia is building a border crossing at Plovanija, which Slovenia disputes, the Slovene ownership of the company vacation homes in Pineta, in which Croatia has accommodated refugees from central Bosnia, the Ljubljanska Banka issue, and similar issues will be discussed in a less abstract manner. Without the fear of prejudicing matters, one thing that can be said before the official announcements reach the media is that the two presidents will find no concrete solutions.

One of the reasons is certainly the fact that the competences of the two state leaders, according to the constitutional organization of their states, are not the same: The Croatian president, who works within a semipresidential system, has more authority than his Slovene counterpart. However, even if this were not so, Croatian-Slovene relations have been so neglected and negatively warmed-over—which both sides are responsible for—that what is at the moment much more important for unfreezing them is genuine relaxedness in issuing public statements, rather than a false compromise that each of the sides would soon interpret in their own way. This would mean that the basic question—if there is a joint willingness of the two states to resolve the problems—has been given a positive answer, which would meet with quite a positive response of the wider European circles. Good vibrations between Tudjman and Kucan would also be an indicative message to the exponents of the political tendencies that have been waiting at the western side of the Adriatic for a chance to use the disagreements between the "premature European babies" to their own advantage. All in all, the greatest responsibility that Tudjman and Kucan bear lies in creating a good atmosphere that should soon prepare and prompt a new rythm at top-level meetings: from those of Prime Ministers Drnovsek and Valentic to those at the level of expert groups, which are dozing at the moment. Everything else is a matter of interests. Whether they will be coordinated or disunited depends on good will.

Delay in Talks Between HDZ, Opposition Viewed

AU1406203094 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 Jun 94 pp 1-3

[Report by Aleksa Crnjakovic: "The Opposition Will Not Give Up Mesic"]

[Text] Zagreb—"Owing to the need for consultations within our parties, we agreed to conclude them by Friday and to agree on the continuation of the negotiations then," Jure Radic stated briefly on Wednesday, after the meeting between the representatives of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and parliamentary opposition parties that lasted for an hour and a half.

The representatives of the Croatian opposition have briefly confirmed Radic's statement and wanted to make no more comments about the negotiations. The HDZ representatives in the negotiations are: Jure Radic, Mate Granic, Adam Mestrovic, Ivan Valent, and Ivic Pasalic. The representatives of the opposition in the negotiations are: Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and Slavko Mestrovic (Croatian National Party), Drazen Budisa (Croatian Social Liberal Party), Stjepan Radic (Croatian Peasants Party), Ivica Racan (Party of Democratic Changes), Ivan Jakovcic (Istrian Democratic Congress), and Slavko Degoricija (Croatian Independent Democrats).

Serbian Troops Said To Take 'Strategic Points'

AU1406174094 Skopje MIC in English 14 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Serbian Soldiers at Macedonian Point"]

[Text] At yesterday's session, the members of the Kriva Palanka local assembly asked the Interior Ministry to inform them about the situation on the northeastern part of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]-Serb border. The session concentrated on the disturbing news that Serbian soldiers had taken over an observation point on the tip Sraza, 250 meters inside Macedonian territory.

According to the unofficial data tabled at the session, 10-15 Serbian soldiers set up tents near the border villages Luka and Podrizikonj about a month ago, and took over the most important strategic points for observation of the Macedonian territory. The [words indistinct] noticed that trenches were being dug next to the tents, as well as movements of transport vehicles and material.

Foreign Minister Views Balkan Relations

AU1506112194 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 10 Jun 94 pp 12-13

[Interview with Stevo Crvenkovski, foreign minister for The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, by Eleonora Karanfilovska; place and date not given: "Approaching the Positions"]

[Text] [Karanfilovska] We are having these discussions just after your discussions with the U.S. special envoy Matthew Nemitz. What is your opinion about these discussions and your impression of Mr. Nemitz's discussions in Athens?

[Crvenkovski] We had very useful meetings and very extensive discussions for two days, encompassing the general picture of the situation in the whole region, and not only relations between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Greece, which is Mr. Nemitz's mandate. We had expanded discussions because these relations are affected by the situation in the whole region. I have not been informed about the course of his discussions in Athens. I think that Mr. Nemitz's stay here will be of great importance for the meetings scheduled for New York next week. It is also very important that during his stay in Ohrid Mr. Nemitz had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the culture and traditions of the Macedonian nation, which will help him obtain a fuller picture of the Republic of Macedonia.

[Karanfilovska] Was that the reason why you invited Mr. Nemitz to Ohrid? There has been some speculation about this in the media.

[Crvenkovski] I think that it was useful to hold the discussions in a more relaxed atmosphere, as well as to take the opportunity of introducing him to the historical values of Ohrid and Macedonia.

[Karanfilovska] Mr. Nemitz stated that both sides had agreed not to reveal the course and the results of the discussions. Therefore, we shall refrain from asking such a question....

[Crvenkovski] Nevertheless, I shall avail myself of this opportunity to remind you that I have been continually repeating this during these months of discussions, for which I was exposed to a series of attacks by journalists. Mr. Nemitz's statement at least helped me to explain my conduct in public.

[Karanfilovska] A number of these attacks appeared in our weekly, too, which also mentioned on several occasions the "Irish formula" as a possible solution for the dispute. We are not asking you whether there are negotiations about that, but what is your opinion, and do you find it acceptable?

[Crvenkovski] The reason why I cannot comment on any formula is because our stance is that there can be no separate solutions for any of the disputed questions, and that is something that we have explicitly advocated since the beginning. What we are prepared to discuss are the entire relations with Greece. If we reach a solution, it should be regulated in a satisfactory way, be acceptable for Europe, and encompass all aspects of mutual relations. In that context we can discuss separate solutions. It is not our goal to solve some transient problems in communications between the two countries, but to find lasting solutions for long-lasting relations.

[Karanfilovska] Now that you have announced a new meeting in New York, probably at the ministerial level, does it mean that such a stance for discussions in a package is acceptable for the other side?

[Crvenkovski] From the statements made by the other side during the past few weeks you could see that such a position has been accepted. Even I know that from their public statements, since we have not had any direct contacts. I think that this is a position that is more broadly accepted by the international community. That is a point that we have persistently insisted upon since the beginning of the dispute and I think that our positions are beginning to converge.

[Karanfilovska] Is Greece a priority in your work?

[Crvenkovski] Basically, what we are trying to do is to conduct a normal foreign policy, and we have been working on "driving that policy" on several tracks from the outset, in order to avoid the trap that Greece fell into when a single problem, regardless of its importance, dominated its entire foreign policy. This is not predominant in our work, neither in terms of the time that we are devoting to it, nor in its essence. It is a huge problem and we discuss it continually with all our partners, but

we are also engaged in what a foreign policy should normally do—not concentrate on one direction and one problem.

[Karanfilovska] We are asking this because of the time that you yourself are spending on the negotiations!

[Crvenkovski] It is true that I am spending a lot of time in New York, but that is principally out of respect for Mr. Cyrus Vance's invitations. They are sent to foreign ministers and I think that it would be impolite to respond at a lower level to invitations from a mediator whom we highly appreciate, and we think it is important to communicate with him properly. It is up to the other side to evaluate its own conduct. Second, the stay there, although linked with the discussions with Mr. Vance, provides a good opportunity for discussing other matters not connected with the dispute. There are a number of countries with which we still have not established contacts, or are having difficulties in establishing them, because we cannot find a suitable place to do this. On the other hand, the United Nations is an excellent place in which all countries have active missions. Therefore, a great deal of work on bilateral questions is carried out there, too.

[Karanfilovska] You did not mention Washington, and you often have meetings with senior U.S. officials during your visits to the United States. You have met Secretary of State Christopher a couple of times. How prominent is the subject of Macedonia-Greece in these discussions, and how bilateral are these relations?

[Crvenkovski] Concerning the level of our relations with the United States and the level of our cooperation, such meetings are normal during every stay there. The subject of Macedonia-Greece arises in all the bilateral meetings, and not only with U.S. officials, because everybody is interested in this. However, the discussions in Washington principally concentrate on bilateral questions and regional problems of interest to ourselves and to our partners, who want to hear our opinions and evaluations.

[Karanfilovska] It looks as if the United States is choosing the more southern part of the Balkans for its presence, from where it will be able to achieve its interests.

[Crvenkovski] I am not in favor of the idea that it has to do with some presence in the region, with some interests, at least not in the prevailing sense, as this is an idea that belongs to the first half of the 20th century and even before that, about spheres of interest and strategic positions in the classic sense. The interest is, first of all, in giving support to models of state development that promise longer stability. The strategic interest of the United States and the European Union in Macedonia is to see the success of the political model that we are applying, which can serve as an example for solving a whole complex of questions that generate severe crises in other places since they are not approached correctly.

[Karanfilovska] Could that be the reason why after Washington was "meandering" from Greece, via Albania and Bulgaria, Macedonia was "selected" as a kind of a partner in the Balkans?

[Crvenkovski] The ties with Macedonia have become closer simply because of the political model, and first of all the internal one, that we have chosen, and they consider that it is in their strategic interest to support it for the sake of stability in Europe, for open borders, with prospects for more intensive development.

[Karanfilovska] Are the present relations in the Balkans, and principally the problems with Greece and the closure of the border, affecting the construction of a different policy toward the other neighbors, and would it have been different if relations with Greece had been different?

[Crvenkovski] I think that the policy would have been the same, but the understanding and the support for that policy might have been different. What is crucial to Macedonia's position in the Balkans is to be open in all directions—transportation and communications—and to take the role that naturally belongs to it, that is to be the crossroads for all movement in the region. That is why it is of the utmost importance to establish normal relations and links with our neighbors. Therefore, the priority is to establish road, railroad, and communications links wherever they existed before. Thus, the east-west corridor was not imposed by the dispute with Greece or the Greek embargo. It was imposed by the natural role of the Republic of Macedonia that it is entitled to in the region. The fact that this corridor is now gaining importance and support from the international community is to a certain extent a result of Greece's conduct and the embargo, and in that context it has helped us. However, the bases of this policy of communications are independent of the dispute, and that should normally be the orientation, as should the development of the north-south route the moment the problems have been overcome. Macedonia cannot play any role, and principally economic, if it does not have both directions. The fact that it is a crossroads is a great advantage for Macedonia. It will lose it if it neglects either of the two directions.

[Karanfilovska] It is paradoxical, but no matter how intractable the problem with Greece might look now, it is, in a way, smaller than the problems, first of all political, that Macedonia is having with the other neighboring countries, with which it still has political and economic cooperation. Why can this cooperation not be achieved with Greece?

[Crvenkovski] We have offered this as a model with Greece from the outset and we have been insisting on it. Everywhere there are problems between neighboring countries. The question is what the attitude of those countries is toward such problems—whether there is an open channel for dialogue, and whether there is good will for finding solutions. We are in favor of these kinds of

relations, because they turned out to be successful in Europe. That is why the relations with Albania and Bulgaria, regardless of a number of questions that are burdening them, are normal relations between European countries. That is how we approach them, and to a great extent that is their conduct toward us, too. Therefore, Europe's relationship toward ourselves and these countries is different.

[Karanfilovska] You said that after the situation is normalized, the Republic of Macedonia will go on developing the north-south route as a road to Europe. However, it looks as if Greece has been redirected on this road via Bulgaria and Romania.

[Crvenkovski] I do not know how they can look for other directions knowing that they are creating problems on all sides and in all possible directions. I do not want to get into their motives for that. For our part, even in relations with Greece, the basis of our foreign policy is dominant, and that is the principle of equal distance with our neighbors.

[Karanfilovska] Do you here also include the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

[Crvenkovski] Absolutely, speaking in the long term, regardless of their situation now.

[Karanfilovska] Nevertheless, at this moment there is no attempt for a dialogue with Belgrade, although this neighbor is still under the regime of the international community's sanctions?

[Crvenkovski] There are no diplomatic contacts because the other side still refuses formally to recognize the Republic of Macedonia. At this moment the question of succession is an open problem. We think that it should be settled where it was agreed—in the Contact Group in Geneva.

[Karanfilovska] Your Yugoslav counterpart does not share this opinion. He thinks that Skopje-Belgrade relations will depend on Skopje-Athens relations.

[Crvenkovski] That is their problem. However, a normal foreign policy should not limit itself to that. I would not accept a foreign policy that would be in one part dictated by someone else or be dependent on third countries.

[Karanfilovska] The Yugoslav Government ordered its Foreign Ministry to start preparations for a dialogue with Albania. In your opinion, is it related to the latest events in the far south of the Balkans?

[Crvenkovski] It certainly is an initiative that deserves congratulations, because it ultimately leads to the acceptance of our basic orientation—that relations in the Balkans can only be solved through dialogue. The greater the number of countries that support it, and the greater the number of bilateral channels for dialogues among Balkan countries that are opened, the faster it will lead toward EU and U.S. strategic interest in supporting our model.

[Karanfilovska] There are certain reservations among part of the opposition and among a number of self-proclaimed independent intellectuals in Macedonia, who have recently appeared in public, saying that the conduct of the Macedonian Government toward Bulgaria is not equal to other countries and that it still has some reservations inherited from the past.

[Crvenkovski] The basic determination of our foreign policy is the principle of equal distance between our neighbors, because that is the only way in which the Republic of Macedonia can conduct a consistent policy even though at this moment it does not actually have a real dialogue with some of its neighbors. Relations with all our neighbors should be put on an equal footing and there can be no more or less privileged relations toward any of our neighbors. This naturally applies to the Republic of Bulgaria, too. Overall, we are trying to develop relations in a rapid and general way, by applying the principle of equal distance and by thoroughly insisting on equal relations in which it will be impossible to place or impose conditions burdened with the past.

[Karanfilovska] Within the framework of stability in the Balkans there certainly stands security. Macedonia still has the open problem of its inclusion in the collective system of the CSCE, although Albania, in staying neutral, abstained, while Greece and Cyprus still oppose it. Another question connected to the security system is the "Partnership for Peace" project in which Macedonia has demonstrated a great interest, and it was even announced as one of the topics for the recent discussions with Mrs. Lin Davis [name as transliterated].

[Crvenkovski] As far as Albania's position on the CSCE is concerned, the meeting of President Gligorov and Mr. Berisha gives us the hope that there will not only be no problems from Albania, but that we can expect active support for the Republic of Macedonia, which indicates a very important step in relations. Concerning the "Partnership for Peace" project, we have shown our interest, as well as in cooperation with NATO. We have had several official contacts, which raised clearly defined interests in cooperation from both sides. We have had intensive discussions on all the possible forms of cooperation with the Western European Union. However, concerning the formal participation of Macedonia in the "Partnership for Peace," at this moment there is one obstacle—membership of the CSCE. We discussed this with Mrs. Davis, and we shall continue the discussions, with the possibility of starting broader contacts before joining the project.

[Karanfilovska] Are there any discussions with the United States about bilateral cooperation on a military plan?

[Crvenkovski] At this stage we think our cooperation should be carried out within the framework of the multilateral organizations, first of all because they have already developed good channels of cooperation with the Republic of Macedonia. A process of adjustment is

necessary in the sense of the military educational system, in order to achieve a cooperation on a compatible level.

[Karanfilovska] Relations in the Balkans are also burdened by some far away partners; we have in mind principally Australia, not only relating to the decision to call the Macedonians Slav Macedonians, but even more because of the division of the Macedonian community in that country into those from Vardar Macedonia and the "others." Is there a danger that this may be accepted as a model for other countries where there are such large communities of Macedonians?

[Crvenkovski] That action of the Australian Government caused a series of consequences that have deeply complicated relations inside Australia, where all the citizens, regardless of their origin, had equal treatment and made the country an example of a multiethnic community. This action, to which we immediately reacted very strongly, sets a precedent that can have consequences not only for the Macedonian community there, but also for others. We know of no country that has renamed its own citizens who have always had the right to declare their national affiliation. I hope that the Australian Government will soon reexamine this action. We were encouraged by the explicit reaction of the media and of some provincial governments. What came as a result of this in Australia is not division, but much stronger cohesion. In this extremely unpleasant situation there has been created greater cohesion and coordination among the Macedonians in Australia. I do not think that this will affect other countries in the sense of limiting the rights of their citizens.

[Karanfilovska] When your name is publicly mentioned, it is usually linked with relations with the Republic of Greece. The journalists' "pursuit" of you usually takes place just at the time negotiations and discussions are carried out about this. There is little talk about the other aspects of your work. What does the minister do in his ministry?

[Crvenkovski] Owing to the growing interest in relations with Greece, there are some very important events from the foreign policy area that remain unnoticed or uncovered. I shall point out the example of the visit to Holland. That was the first official visit to a European country after the establishment of diplomatic relations, to which the Dutch side devoted great importance—a meeting was scheduled with the prime minister, there were separate discussions with five ministers, there was an address in parliament... it was an extremely important event for our foreign policy.

As far as the work here is concerned, we were heavily engaged in organizing the ministry itself and its equipment, and in setting up embassies within a very short period of time. If we just have a look at this, together with the international meetings and conferences that we have attended and where we have achieved results, only then can we see the job that has been done here in the ministry.

[Karanfilovska] The public often operates with wrong images. There prevails the opinion that you are a recluse, an uncommunicative minister, who rarely makes statements, who is often absent... however, on the other hand, people who have had official meetings with you have a different impression. We hear that you have established private contacts with them, that you often meet your partners, talk with them, and solve diplomatic problems in a different way, not only in your office....

[Crvenkovski] The impression that I rarely make statements, I would say, arises from the interest in the discussions with Greece. If you look at all my statements, I think that I may even appear too often. At one time I was even attacked by some opposition politicians for being too great a presence in public. As for the impression that people from the outside have, those who I have contacts with, it is true that it is much easier to establish official contacts with a state if you establish friendly links. That is normal in the work of every foreign minister if he wants to be successful. Private contacts are important first of all for the official part of the work, because they enable you to address a partner in the world at any time, asking for advice, an opinion, or support.

[Karanfilovska] It is evident that, in spite of all your engagement, you will retain the image of "minister for Greece." Do you think that at the end of your mandate it will have a positive or negative connotation?

[Minister] I cannot make evaluations about the final impression on my work. Nevertheless, it is true that what I am doing is far from being subordinated to relations with Greece.

MIC Reports 'Provocations' by Serbian Church

AU1506085194 Skopje MIC in English 14 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "New Provocations by SOC—Three-Month Ultimatum"]

[Text] The Serbian Orthodox Church [SOC] is continuing with provocations of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Orthodox Church [MOC]. As it is known, the SOC has given the MOC a "three-month deadline to return to the canonic order, and if not, an appropriate church procedure would be initiated."

Last Friday [10 June], the Macedonian authorities from the border near Tabanovce, escorted the Vranje bishop of the SOC Pahomie back to Serb territory, who was recently appointed "administrator of the eparchies in Macedonia" by the SOC. His intention was to submit the decision of the Holy Synod of the SOC to the "Skopje and Macedonia metropolitan Mr. Mihail." He also carried a request to the Macedonian border organs to enable the interrupted entrance of the Serbian priests into Macedonia and the uninterrupted execution of their mission and intention—holding religious services in Serbian language in the Macedonian churches.

The decision of the Macedonian authorities not to allow Pahomie to enter Macedonia, created an outburst in Serbia. The media mainly operates with the arguments such as violation of human rights, deprivation of rights, brutal use of force, insulting priests who have come in a "mission of God," etc.

A representative of the MOC stated yesterday that the Holy Synod of the MOC did not receive an official announcement from the SOC regarding the arrival of the Vranje bishop Pahomie, nor the message which was supposed to be sent to the Archbishop of Macedonia and Ohrid Mr. Mihail.

Ministers To Sign Cooperation Agreement

94BA0315A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 1 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Vodusek: "Unfounded Criticisms of the 'Policization' of the Army"]

[Text] *News conference of Defense Minister Jelko Kacin and State Secretary Boris Znidaric*

Ljubljana, 31 May—The ministers of defense and internal affairs will sign a protocol next week, a document on cooperation between the two ministries. A coordinating group that will settle unresolved issues in the area of preparing systemic legislation and derivative legal acts and in the area of education on an ongoing basis will meet for the first time in May, according to a statement at today's news conference by Defense Minister Jelko Kacin and State Secretary Boris Znidaric.

The protocol will delineate precisely the areas of operation and confirm agreements on closer mutual cooperation, ongoing notification, and mutual assistance in coordinating tasks and operations.

Both Znidaric and Kacin rejected criticisms of the "policization" of the army as unfounded. Regarding those criticisms by former Defense Minister Janez Jansa, made nine days after the appearance of the new state secretary, Jelko Kacin said that it was not possible to policize any system in such a short time, especially not a military one.

The results of an internal investigation within the Defense Ministry regarding the Smolnikar scandal have been sent to the prime minister, Kacin said. The internal commission, which is headed by Miran Bogataj, will function as long as there is a possibility of discovering new aspects of the background of the event in the village of Depala.

The investigation of the attack on Mitja Kunstelj and the Krkovic-Blagojevic case are in the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The defense minister did not confirm the suspicions that organized dark forces, which might threaten the lives of the chief witnesses in the case, might be behind the incident (except that "the events happened in the dark"). The Defense Ministry learned about the attack against Mitja Kunstelj only late in the afternoon, whereas the attack happened at midnight. Kunstelj, judging by the defense minister's answers, evaded the protection of the bodyguard assigned to him by the Defense Ministry, Jelko Kacin also said.

The news conference was otherwise devoted primarily to the Defense Ministry's foreign policy activities. Defense Minister Jelko Kacin cited numerous meetings with the defense ministers of foreign countries during the Brussels conference. In the final documents of that conference, Slovenia, in addition to neutral Sweden and Finland, is also mentioned as a signatory of the Partnership for Peace. In Kacin's opinion, admission to the Western European Union will only be possible after Slovenia obtains associate membership in the European Union.

Jelko Kacin also mentioned as important his talks with the U.S. and Italian defense ministers. With the U.S. secretary of defense, Kacin talked about the possibility of lifting the embargo against Slovenia, while the subject of the talks with the Italian defense minister was a document on cooperation in the military area. Italy will be the third country with which we have signed such an agreement.

Tomorrow, Austrian President Thomas Klestil will also be accompanied by the Austrian defense minister, the Czech defense minister is coming to Slovenia in September, and also during that month a Slovene delegation will visit the NATO base in Avignan.

At the news conference, Miran Bogataj assessed the Defense Ministry's participation in an international conference on reducing natural disasters, at which there was a discussion of the global threat and of a strategy until the year 2000.

Personnel Reshuffled in Defense Ministry

94BA0303D Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 23 May 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Vodusek: "Shifts in the 'Pentagon'"]

[Text] *The most radical changes were suffered by Moris; consequences of the Smolnikar scandal in VOMO [Defense Ministry Security Service]; the army's support depends on the governing policy.*

Ljubljana, 23 May—At this morning's meeting the Defense Committee, among other things, discussed a report from Minister Jelko Kacin on personnel changes in the Slovene "Pentagon." There are no longer many individuals in the ministry's leadership from the inner circle of former Defense Minister Janez Jansa and the coordinating group that prepared and conducted the country's defense within the army.

If we can judge by Jelko Kacin's statements, the expected shifts will stop with the chief of the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defense [TO], Albin Gutman. Specifically, approval from President Milan Kucan is required for replacements in the leadership of the General Staff.

Colonel-General Albin Gutman was the commander of the provincial TO headquarters for Carniola, which is headed by Rade Klisaric. Along with some of Jansa's associates involved in the maneuvers structure of national defense, he is on the notorious list from Dossier 13. With the replacements of the provincial TO headquarters commanders—the last one was at the provincial TO headquarters for the southern coastal region—the list of expected replacements has probably been exhausted.

Two politicians, however, think that the situation in the army is "extremely problematic." Janez Jansa is convinced that a political purge is being conducted at the Defense Ministry, while the former chairman of the

Defense Committee, Zmago Jelincic, is of the opinion that Minister Kacin has no other choice but to clean up after his predecessor. "If he does not succeed, it is best to disband the army and rely on the police," Jelincic concluded in the latest SOBOTNA PRILOGA.

Jansa criticized State Secretary Boris Znidaric, who came to the Defense Ministry after 23 years of service in the police leadership, of running the army like the police. Znidaric, in addition to two other state secretaries, is responsible for training, organization, and personnel in the Defense Ministry.

The most radical changes, after Jansa's removal, were suffered primarily by the Moris First Special Brigade. After the replacement of Brigadier Anton Krkovic, the defense minister was not satisfied with its effectiveness. If we can judge by the experiences of foreign countries, one should not expect it to be disbanded, although even outwardly Moris is to be made equivalent to other Slovene army units.

The disputes between the army's special brigade and the police have a political background, if we can reach a conclusion from the dramaturgy of the Smolnikar scandal, and they also originate from the conflicts and old grudges among individual participants in that operation. In fact, the agents in the spy scandal were employed by the First Special Brigade.

The above conflict was most evident in the Defense Ministry's Security Service. Three heads of VOMO have been replaced in a six-month period. The departure of Andrej Lovsin at the peak of the war among the intelligence officers several months before the replacement of Janez Jansa allows different explanations. Dusan Mikus, who was replaced by Marjan Miklavcic, had to leave his job as director because of the Smolnikar scandal. A conversation lasting several hours between Jelko Kacin and Dusan Mikus about the top secret Bizjak report did not bear any significant fruit.

Among the directors of the individual administrations, the only one to be dismissed was Janez J. Svajncer, who left as managing editor of the magazine SLOVENSKI VOJAK. The director of the Second Administration, Joze Zagozen, after talking to the parliamentary commission on the arms scandal, reportedly told the defense minister that after taking leave, he intends to resign from his position.

The statistics, according to which the new defense minister, Jelko Kacin, appointed 15 new people in two months, while approximately as many people left the ministry, do not say much, since those figures apply to the structure of the Defense Ministry. More important is the political decision on how many soldiers and what kind of army the state needs, and there will undoubtedly be parliamentary discussions of this.

The Assembly's decision on the defense tolar, i.e., investments in fundamental development programs over the next 10 years, which, after the personnel changes, will undoubtedly be the most important topic of polemics regarding the Defense Ministry, is only halfway toward building our own army.

The dilemmas concerning Slovenia without an army, which several politicians recorded in the so-called "Declaration for Peace" in 1991, have not yet been surmounted, at least judging by the views of parliamentarians, in spite of the war and the fundamentally changed circumstances in our vicinity. For the time being, support for the army depends upon the control and influence of the ruling policy.

Fulfillment of 1989 'May Declaration' Assessed

94BA0303F Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 20 May 94 p 2

[Article signed by 40 Slovene politicians: "The May Declaration—Five Years Later"]

[Text] The May Declaration as a political starting point for social renewal contains four fundamental goals:

—state independence;

—democracy as a basis for social restructuring;

—a parliamentary multiparty system as a basis for the political structure;

—an economic system based on the experiences of the modern welfare society.

All those fundamental goals are mutually interdependent conditions for each other, and are therefore only attainable as a whole.

We have achieved:

—state independence and international recognition;

—a constitutionally sovereign state, which has created the necessary normative starting point for Slovenia as a law-governed and social-welfare state based on the protection of human rights, private property, and free enterprise;

—a formal democracy as a basis for social renewal and restructuring;

—a political structure with a parliamentary multiparty system.

The following have not been achieved:

—the new state actually has not broken off continuity with the previous totalitarian structure. It has not acknowledged and has not condemned the worst actions of totalitarian violence and the violation of human rights;

—the constitution has not been followed by legislation that would take its general starting points to the level of feasibility. The constitution has remained an unfinished work that cannot survive without executive legislation and is therefore threatened itself;

—democracy, as a basis for social restructuring, has admittedly been achieved on the formal level, but the oligarchic structure of society from the communist period has been preserved, mostly with the same people in social roles and with essentially unchanged relationships of social power. That allows those who hold that power to have their present positions also formally legitimized, and to use them to block further democratic transformation.

An assessment of the present political and legal situation leads to the conclusion that there is almost complete continuity withthe structure and distribution of social power that prevailed under the communist regime, and an actual discontinuity with the political will and efforts that governed the so-called Slovene Spring.

What Next

We have to continue where we were stopped:

—to reunite and mobilize all those forces which carried out the break with communism and began social renewal, and moreover on the basis of modern political organization;

—to continue resolutely with the democratization of society on the basis of a new redistribution of social power and social roles. Above all, accelerated privatization and the reorganization of the state administration and state services should contribute to that goal. All illegally appropriated social property should be returned;

—to accelerate legislation that will ensure actual implementation of the constitution and not just the formal coordination of the former legal order that was the basis for the communist regime.

Note: Among the first to sign "The May Declaration—Five Years Later" were Dr. Miha Tisler, Dr. Ludvik Toplak, Dr. Anton Trstenjak, Dame Zajc, Dr. Janez Bernik, Dr. Peter Jambrek, Dr. Miha Brejc, Drago Jancar, Niko Grafenauer, Joze Snoj, Tone Kuntner, Dr. Ivo Urbancic, Evgen Bavcar, Marja Strojin, Boris Cavazza, Dare Valic, Dr. Primoz Simoniti, Vinko Kobal, Dr. Berta Jereb, Boris Pahor, Leon Gostisa, Ivan Persak, Dr. France Bucar, Viktor Blazic, Dr. Joze Pucnik, Dr. Franc Zagozen, Ivan Oman, Marjan Podobnik, Janez Jansa, Vane Gosnik, Saso Lap, Marjan Vidmar, Ivan Pucnik, Janez Podobnik, Dr. Anton Strojin, Dr. Marjan Jereb, Rudi Seligo, Veno Taufer, and Lojze Lebic.

Poll Shows Slovene Intolerance, Fears

94BA0306A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 30 May 94 pp 28-29

[Article by Svetlana Vasovic-Mekina: "Germans Closer Than the Croats"]

[Text] *The southern neighbors are threatening the Slovenes; why 36 Jews are threatening 20 percent of Slovenia's citizens.*

In a few days the findings of the "Slovene Public Opinion '94" poll will be officially presented to the Slovene public. The results of this year's undertaking are also interesting because of the possibility of a long-term comparison; the Slovene public opinion poll (which has been conducted since back in 1968 by the Public Opinion Research Center of the Ljubljana School of Social Sciences, under the leadership of Dr. Niko Tos) can boast of the longest tradition of that type on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This year 1,050 respondents participated in the project.

Strengthened Right Wing

This year's results undoubtedly show interesting shifts. Last year the constantly emphasized dispute between Slovene President Milan Kucan and former Defense Minister Janez Jansa led to a "rewarding" of Jansa's aggressive policy, and a partial reconciliation of the electorate with Jansa's side, although Kucan still remains the politician who enjoys the confidence of all strata of Slovene society. At the same time, the recent dispute between the Police and Defense Ministries (the arrest of civilian Milan Smolnikar, overstepping the authority of the Defense Ministry's commissioner, as a result of which Jansa then took off), in spite of the stormy media campaign of the media loyal to Jansa, nevertheless did not harm the police at all, but rather primarily the Defense Ministry. Although the Slovene Defense Ministry, after 1991 (the June conflicts with the Yugoslav People's Army—author's note), received only the highest assessments in comparison with all other state institutions, after the above-mentioned case of the beating of a civilian, the situation abruptly changed; the ministry lost credit, and the public became much more critical of the activities of the Defense Ministry, which is now headed by Jelko Kacin.

Naturally, the most interesting indicators are those concerning the oscillations of nationalism and interethnic intolerance. A comparison with last year's results leads to the assessment that those phenomena are slightly rising. The researchers see changes in the social structure as the causes of this. The feeling of being threatened is increasing primarily because of the war in the vicinity of Slovenia, as well as the increasingly clearer realization that the presence of refugees in Slovenia will remain a lasting problem. Only two years ago, at the time of the fiercest Serbian-Croatian war, polls at that time showed a very high, almost euphoric solidarity with the refugees; today the euphoria has vanished, and the solidarity has turned to rejection. The most perverse fact in all of this is that as many as 20 percent of the Slovene citizens polled "would not like to have a Jew as a neighbor" (in the 1991 census, according to data from the Slovene Statistical Yearbook, "as many as" 36 inhabitants stated themselves to be Jews); although anti-Semitism has not

flourished in Slovenia to date, the latest results show the power of a stereotype, in which the respondents' personal experience obviously does not play any role at all. The researchers' interpretation is that such extremely nationalistic and racist prejudices are the results of "nonexperiential orientations," which means that the respondents form their attitude indirectly, on the basis of shifts in other societies close to them, for example in Austria, Germany, or Italy.

Foreign Brothers

Increased ethnic oversensitivity is being manifested in two forms: as aggressive nationalism (the group that supports such views represents about 10 percent of the population), and as distrust on the part of a majority of Slovenes toward the neighboring Yugoslav peoples, until yesterday "fraternal" ones, toward whom a majority of the respondents today express great coolness. In some cases, that deliberate emphasis on difference goes to ridiculous extremes. For example, in response to the question "How much are the peoples listed similar to Slovenes?" the respondents ranked the Germans in first place as closest to themselves, then the Austrians, and then, in order, the Swiss, the Czechs and Slovaks, the Croats, the Italians, the Americans, the Hungarians, the Russians, the Bosnians, and at the very end—the Serbs and Turks. On the other hand, in response to the question "Which languages do you use or understand?" the respondents answered that almost 90 percent of them spoke or understood Serbo-Croatian, 45.1 percent German, 37.3 percent English, 17.2 percent Italian, 6.2 percent French, and so forth. The irony is that thus, the vast majority of Slovenes, because of linguistic closeness and coexistence for many years in the same state, speak well and understand the languages of the peoples whom they view as the most foreign to them of all the peoples on the face of the earth. What lies behind such radical responses is an expression of sympathy or antipathy toward the actions of different peoples and states when Slovenia became independent, and a critical view of the causes of the war in Bosnia.

The coolness that Slovenes express toward their "brothers to the south" is also apparent in connection with the answers to the question "Who is threatening Slovenia?" According to the majority's opinion, Slovenia is still most threatened by Croatia (50.2 percent), immediately followed by Serbia (46.6 percent). The third big and serious threat to Slovenia consists of the refugees (30.2 percent of the respondents), then Russia (27.3 percent of the respondents), and only then Italy (16.2 percent), with which Slovenia has a dispute over the Osimo accords, and Austria (5 percent), which has not yet fulfilled (and probably never will) its obligations from article 7 of the state treaty on the protection of the Slovene minority in Austria.

Finally, after several years of critical reactions from the respondents, some positive vibrations can be observed only in the area of living conditions. Most of the respondents optimistically expect an improvement in living conditions in the future, even though no one expects dramatically rapid jumps. Such views are even partly confirmed by the data on the growth of exports, the halt in the growth of unemployment, and increases in direct foreign investments last year in Slovenia, which is trying right now to compensate finally for the loss of the former Yugoslav markets through free trade agreements with the members of the Visegrad group of countries.

What Should Be the Condition for Receiving Slovene Citizenship?

Knowledge of the Slovene language	91%
Living for a long time in Slovenia	88%
Familiarity with Slovene culture	70%
Slovene descent	60%
Born in Slovenia	45%
Christian religion	28%

Who Is Threatening Slovenia?

Refugees	30.2%
Minorities	20%
Japan	3%
United States	4%
Germany	4%
Russia	27.3%
Serbia	46.6%
Croatia	50.2%
Hungary	3%
Austria	5%
Italy	16.2%

Federal

Yugoslav Revolutionary Youth Organization Founded

94BA0303C Maribor VECER in Slovene 21 May 94 p 6

[Article by Zarko Rakovic: "From Vardar to Triglav?"]

[Text] *The communists in Yugoslavia have obtained successors; they founded the Yugoslav Revolutionary Youth Organization in Belgrade; by "Yugoslavia," they mean the one of Tito's time.*

Belgrade (from our associate)—Communism in Yugoslavia has not yet died; it has only turned into a vampire. In the building of the former Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [CC LCY], at the confluence of the Sava and the Danube, the Yugoslav Revolutionary Youth Organization [JRM], or, as its leaders call it, the Communist Youth of Yugoslavia, held its founding assembly. By "Yugoslavia" they do not mean the present mini-Yugoslavia, but rather the one from Broz's time, which reached from Triglav to Vardar. The JRM's first activities have already begun. Fourteen years after Tito's death, one can see on Belgrade streets posters saying "We are Tito's—Tito is ours," and one can hear the anthem "Hey, Slavs."

That circus of communist offspring would not merit any attention if it did not have its base in the building of the former CC LCY, which is controlled and managed by Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia. The JRM has guaranteed spaces there and the best opportunities to operate, which means that the ruling Serbian regime is backing it. Who are those young people and where are they from (actually they are not really young, since none of them is under 25) is hard to find out. It is even harder to explain their harsh slogans, uttered with a fist raised high: "We will restore Yugoslavia," "Hope is on the left," "Fraternity and unity again," "Socialism is democracy," "The five-pointed star is our shrine...."

The residents of Belgrade who have seen that communist offspring of Yugoslavia did not realize immediately what was going on. At first they thought that some sort of film was being taped. Recently, in fact, a splendid impersonator of Josip Broz, known as Micko, on instructions from director Zelimir Zilnik, walked along Belgrade streets and spoke with astonished bystanders. Skillfully disguised and dressed in a marshal's uniform, he asked Belgrade residents whether they missed him at all. Most of them answered that they regretted that he was no longer with them, and that he was in their hearts forever.

Forever?

The establishment of the JRM obviously indicates that people in the present Yugoslavia also think so.

Simic Receives Head of Croatian Bureau

LD1406170494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1549 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Belgrade, June 14 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic and head of the Croatian Bureau in Belgrade Zvonimir Markovic agreed on Tuesday it was necessary to restore communications and economic and other ties between Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) and Croatia, which they said would pave the way to resolving vital problems in Serbo-Croatian relations.

The Yugoslav Information Ministry said in a statement that Markovic briefed Simic about the Croatian Bureau's activities and handed him a letter from Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign minister.

The two sides agreed that Simic's visit to Zagreb on February 12, was a step towards resuming negotiations aimed at normalizing mutual relations and stabilizing the overall political situation in the region. They also said they hoped that Simic and Granic would meet soon and that outstanding problems would be resolved on an equal footing and in the spirit of tolerance which had so far prevailed in the talks between Yugoslavia and Croatia. Croatia violently seceded from the former Yugoslav federation in mid-1991.

Explosions Continue Following Lightning Strike

LD1406160194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1506 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Belgrade, June 14 (TANJUG)—Sporadic explosions could still be heard at Tuesday noon from an army ammunition dump in Lisicji Potok in Belgrade which was struck by a lightning while a thunderstorm was raging over Belgrade on Monday night. Military sources say that no one was killed in the explosion, that the situation is "under control" and that there is "no danger of the explosion spreading and endangering civilian facilities."

Early on Tuesday, reporters and photographers were denied access for security reasons to the underground ammunition dump where explosives for military exercises are kept. A team of TANJUG's reporters who managed to come near the dump situated in the popular Belgrade picnic site of Kosutnjak say the explosions occur at approximately 40-minute intervals. The whole area smells of gunpowder and is covered by a cloud of whitish smoke.

The road to the dump is heavily guarded by army and [word indistinct] forces who have advised the residents of Kosutnjak to avoid walking in the woods for fear that some explosives might have been blown onto the grass.

Teams of military experts who are clearing up the terrain say that the rain is helping them prevent the fire from spreading.

A part of the residential area near the dump was evacuated in the night between Monday and Tuesday. Widow of the late Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito, Jovanka Broz, whose residence is located near the ammunition dump, was among them.

General Staff Issues Statement

AU1406162294 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] We have just received an announcement from the Information Service of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army that says the following:

On the occasion of the explosion in the depot of training and instructive explosive equipment in Lisicji Potok on 13 June at 2330, the Information Service of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army points out the following facts:

The public has already been told that Jelena Djordjevic was injured in the explosion, that she has been hospitalized at the Army Medical Academy, and that she is successfully recovering. Nobody was injured among the officers and soldiers.

A commission of the head of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army has been on the site of the accident since the explosion to establish all the circumstances under which the explosion took place. It was indubitably ascertained that the explosion was caused by lightning and that any possibility of a diversion, sabotage, or any other cause is excluded.

The fire has been localized and is expected to be completely extinguished soon. The site of the accident is under control and there is no possibility of any further explosions or the spreading of the fire. There is no danger to the population and there are no reasons for alarm or fear of the incident repeating.

Further on, the report says the following: Expert teams of the Yugoslav Army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia have been clearing the site and removing all objects that can present a danger to people's life or health. In this respect, citizens are expected to show cooperation.

The General Staff of the Yugoslav Army expresses thanks to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, the Belgrade fire-fighting teams, and the citizens for their cooperation, constructivity, calmness, and vigilance and asks them to eliminate rumors among themselves about nonexistent causes for explosion. The moment conditions for secure work are created, access to the site of the explosion and contact with eyewitnesses of the explosion and officers who can provide expert explanation will be made available to journalists.

The General Staff of the Yugoslav Army points out that as a consequences of the explosion, a certain quantity of material that may be dangerous was scattered and therefore it asks citizens not to touch any objects that seem to them to be suspicious, but to report any such case to the General Staff Commission, the military authorities, or the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it is said in the announcement of the Information Service of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army.

Kosovo

DSK Admits Albania Guiding Movement

LD1006190394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1725 GMT 10 Jun 94

[Text] Pristina, June 10 (TANJUG)—Fehmi Agani, second in command in the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK) party of the Albanian separatists in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet), openly admitted on Friday that the Republic of Albania was guiding the activities of the political movement of the Albanians in the province.

The DSK vice-chairman told a press conference that "identity of stands between the DSK and Albania" was reaffirmed on Thursday during the talk between DSK Chairman Ibrahim Rugova and Albanian President Sali Berisha.

Agani said that "consultations and coordination of DSK activities with Albania were one of the major results of the political movement of the Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija." Agani admitted that Albania's "strong support" was the major factor of success of the struggle for the fulfillment of DSK demands.

The Albanian separatists have been trying for decades to secede Kosovo-Metohija from Serbia, i.e. the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.), using conventional terrorist methods and attacking members of the police and the army. The F.R.Y.'s attempts to develop good-neighbourly relations with neighbouring Republic of Albania remain unsuccessful because Tirana is persistently and openly supporting the separatist movement in Kosmet, thus meddling with the F.R.Y.'s internal affairs.

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